Friday, January 01, 2010

Nuclear Non-Proliferation has a START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty).

...There are three major sticking points in the new agreement: (click title to entry - thank you)

1. How to link strategic arms reduction with restricting the global missile-defense system.

2. Limiting the "return potential" - the number of carriers and warheads which are stockpiled but could be brought back into action.

3. Control over mobile ground systems and restrictions on the areas of their deployment.

The missile-defense system long ago became a political issue between Russia and the United States. Nevertheless, a missile defense system capable of protecting against several hundred intercontinental missiles is unlikely to be built in the next 15 to 20 years. Therefore, all it could do would be to minimize damage in case of an attack, and only if its first strike hits the bulk of the enemy's missiles. And, even so, in case of a hypothetical conflict between Russia and the United States, dozens of warheads would break through, and damage would be unacceptable....

The original START I treaty was signed on July 31, 1991 and entered into enforceable law on December 5, 1994. It was limited to the USA and Russia. While that is a huge accomplishment for both nations are they being short sighted to leave China out of the equation?

When START I was enforceable China was only beginning its nuclear focus. It was no threat to any nation, but, it has come a long way and to overlook the potential it has to the stability of the civilized world is to realize Japan's disarmament is worthless and gratuitous.

Last updated Feb. 4, 2003
Summary of Chinese Nuclear Arsenal: (click here)

China's nuclear arsenal is in the midst of a rapid modernization program begun in the mid-1980s. By increasing the size, accuracy, range, and survivability of the nuclear arsenal, Chinese leaders aim to strengthen Beijing's deterrent. China hopes to mimic the United States and Russia in deploying its nuclear weapons in a sea-, air-, and land-based triad. U.S. intelligence and defense agencies predict that over the next 15 years China may increase the number of warheads aimed at U.S. targets from 20 to between 75-100.

In the next decade, China will likely make its most precipitous headway in the development of ballistic missiles. Development efforts stress increasing the number of mobile, solid-fuel, intercontinental missiles in order to maximize deterrence. Currently China has a host of nuclear missiles at its disposal. These include 20 liquid-fueled intermediate range Dong Feng-4s (DF-4s), 48 medium range solid-fuel DF-21s, which are mobile, and 20 silo-based intercontinental DF-5s, which can reach the United States. The DF-3 has become outdated and is being retired. Other solid-fueled short-range missiles, the DF-11 and DF-15 (they are called the M-11 and M-9 when exported), may have nuclear capability. Two new mobile solid-fuel intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) are under development.

U.S. intelligence surmises that China has long had the ability to develop multiple reentry vehicles (MRVs) for its missiles. Should China choose to develop these systems, ICBMs could be so-outfitted within only a few years. U.S. deployment of a missile defense system could precipitate such action...

The problem is this, the USA has advanced systems the global community views as a threat to their national security. That is no small matter. It doesn't matter if the missile shield systems don't work and haven't worked for decades costing the USA treasury megabucks of worthless endeavor, the global community views this potential as real.

Part of the reason the USA will not capitulate its technology is a matter of pride and a form of 'selling out' for peace, but, also because the 'viewed potential' can serve the purpose as a deterrent.

The 'truth' is that deterrent isn't real and it is foolish to continue any appearance of such a measure as a valid issue for national security for the USA. The PROBLEM is with such a measure 'in the mix' of diplomacy and international stability there are real barriers to the movement forward.

So, the question arises, how 'in fact' do we accomplish more than just another START treaty but real and profound non-proliferation?

It might be that START is simply a history lesson and today the real measure of peace and non-proliferation is bringing all the five legal nuclear nations to same Peace Table to bring about the change a weary world views as the quintessential measure for enforceable non-proliferation.

I profoundly believe 'we have to go there' and I also strongly believe the USA and Russia can deliver that reality to the children of their nations.

I would strongly suggest the first step that should and can be taken immediately is for the USA and Russia to sign a Pre-Treaty Summit Pact to pursue to the end such an agreement and have it legislated into law by both the USA legislature and the Russian Duma.