The Cheney Observer
Congress dithers, states left with bill
By Matt Stearns - McClatchy Newspapers
WASHINGTON -- When Congress passed a $286 billion transportation bill two years ago, many experts said it was far short -- almost $100 billion short -- of the investment needed to maintain the nation's roads and bridges.
But lawmakers weren't willing to take the political risk of increasing the federal fuel tax, which Congress has left unchanged since 1993. Last week's deadly bridge collapse in Minneapolis may not reverse that sentiment, either. President Bush declared his outright opposition to a gas-tax increase twice this week.
Frustrated with federal inaction, some states and municipalities are trying to find ways to deal with soaring infrastructure costs on their own. In the transportation realm, solutions include politically risky local tax increases and leasing public assets to private investors.
Minnesota Gov. Tim Pawlenty, a Republican, has vetoed an increase in the state fuel tax twice, but said last week that he was now open to one after the bridge collapsed. The last time Minnesota's fuel tax was raised was 1988. Other states also are considering the move. Since 1993, the last time the federal tax went up, 28 states have increased their fuel taxes, but only three have raised them enough to keep pace with inflation.
Toll roads are another popular solution. At least 23 states are planning new toll roads -- including seven states that haven't had any -- largely to deal with shortfalls from traditional funding sources, according to a federal report. About 5 percent of state highway revenues come from tolls, and that's expected to increase to 7 percent within a few years.
"For new construction, it's either toll road or no road," said Neil Gray, spokesman for the International Bridge, Tunnel & Turnpike Association, which represents toll authorities. "Because the federal money has been inadequate and the states have a growing raft of other needs."
http://www.centredaily.com/news/nation/story/176090.html
Tucson, Arizona Published: 08.09.2007
Question: What is the NAFTA superhighway, and how would it work?
Answer: NAFTA superhighway is a buzz phrase for major transportation corridors that carry international trade through the three biggest countries of North America: Mexico, the United States and Canada.
These highways existed long before implementation of the North American Free Trade Agreement began on Jan. 1, 1994.
With total domestic freight tonnage projected to increase 67 percent by 2020, the race is on to secure funding to maintain and improve the U.S. domestic transportation infrastructure and to build new roads to alleviate critical congestion on the nation's roads.
Interstate 35, which extends from the Mexican border at Laredo, Texas, to Duluth, Minn., has been referred to as the "NAFTA Superhighway" for many years. I-35 already carries a substantial amount of international trade between Mexico, the United States and Canada.
There is also a push from various states to complete I-69 so that it will go from the Rio Grande Valley in Texas to the Port Huron border crossing in Michigan. Currently, I-69 starts at Port Huron and ends in Indianapolis.
However, a powerful group of proponents, including former House Majority Leader Tom DeLay of Texas and former Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist of Tennessee, has worked to extend it down the Mississippi River to Memphis, Tenn., then south into Arkansas and Louisiana, and finally through Texas to the Mexican border.
Texas, meanwhile, has proposed a system of superhighways called the Trans-Texas corridor.
http://www.azstarnet.com/news/195614
Heaton faces sentencing in Abramoff scandal
Feds go to bat for man who helped bring down Congressman Ney
By Joel Seidman
Producer
NBC News
Updated: 2:56 p.m. ET Aug 10, 2007
WASHINGTON - He was a secret undercover informant in the heart of the Capitol, and an unlikely linchpin in the government's Washington influence peddling investigation that netted a powerful six-term congressman.
Prosecutors, for the first time, say it was only with the assistance of a young, twenty-something, congressional staffer named Will Heaton, and weeks of secretly taped conversations with his boss, which enabled them to finally bring down Ohio Republican Rep. Bob Ney, compelling Ney to plead guilty in the Jack Abramoff lobbying scandal.
Now, after pleading guilty to a single felony count himself in the lobbying conspiracy - and facing a stiff prison sentence, Heaton wants a federal judge to grant him leniency.
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/20215759/
Uh oh! Here comes the 'D' word
August 11, 2007 - 7:13am.
For the length of the Iraq war, President George W. Bush has claimed reinstating the military draft was "not an option" and that a draft "will not be considered."
List most claims by this most duplicitous of Presidents, things have changed.
With no end of the war in sight and Bush's promise this week to stay as long as it takes to establish a stable democratic government in Iraq (which would be never), the military is running out of a few good men...and women.
So now Bush's military adviser says a draft is worth considering.
Bush war adviser: Draft worth a look - Frequent tours for U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan have stressed the all-volunteer force and made it worth considering a ...
http://www.capitolhillblue.com/cont/node/3122
Iraq war boss says US draft 'worth considering'
Posted Sat Aug 11, 2007 9:00am AEST
Volunteer military: A US soldier on patrol outside Baghdad (AFP: Roslan Rahman)
The top US military officer in charge of coordinating the war effort in Iraq says that it makes sense to consider a return of the draft to meet the military's needs.
Lieutenant General Douglas Lute, who serves as the White House deputy national security adviser, says the all-volunteer military is serving "exceedingly well" and the administration has not decided it needs to be replaced with a draft.
But in an interview with National Public Radio, he says a return of the draft is worth considering.
"I think it makes sense to certainly consider it and I can tell you, this has always been an option on the table."
"But ultimately, this is a policy matter between meeting the demands for the nation's security by one means or another."
- AFP
http://abc.net.au/news/stories/2007/08/11/2002469.htm?section=world
Top Bush Official Mulls War Draft
The White House's new war adviser, Army Lt. Gen. Douglas Lute, said our nation's all-volunteer force is reaching its limits due to multiple tours in Iraq and Afghanistan.
"I think it makes sense to certainly consider it," Army Lt. Gen. Douglas Lute said in an interview with National Public Radio's "All Things Considered."
"And I can tell you, this has always been an option on the table. But ultimately, this is a policy matter between meeting the demands for the nation's security by one means or another," Lute added in his first interview since he was confirmed by the Senate in June.
Lute said the frequent deployments affect not only the troops but also their families who influence if service members "re-up."
http://www.nbcsandiego.com/militaryconnection/13869956/detail.html
Bush war adviser: Draft worth a look
By Brendan Smialowski, Getty Images
WASHINGTON (AP) — Frequent tours for U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan have stressed the all-volunteer force and make it worth considering a return to a military draft, President Bush's new war adviser said Friday.
"I think it makes sense to certainly consider it," Army Lt. Gen. Douglas Lute said in an interview with National Public Radio's "All Things Considered."
"And I can tell you, this has always been an option on the table. But ultimately, this is a policy matter between meeting the demands for the nation's security by one means or another," Lute added in his first interview since he was confirmed by the Senate in June.
President Nixon abolished the draft in 1973. Restoring it, Lute said, would be a "major policy shift" and Bush has made it clear that he doesn't think it's necessary.
The repeated deployments affect not only the troops but their families, who can influence whether a service member decides to stay in the military, Lute said.
http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2007-08-10-lute-draft_N.htm
When the Vice President Does It, That Means It’s Not Illegal
By FRANK RICH
Published: July 1, 2007
WHO knew that mocking the Constitution could be nearly as funny as shooting a hunting buddy in the face? Among other comic dividends, Dick Cheney's legal theory that the vice president is not part of the executive branch yielded a priceless weeklong series on "The Daily Show" and an online "Doonesbury Poll," conducted at Slate, to name Mr. Cheney's indeterminate branch of government.
TimesSelect subscribers can listen to a reading of the day's Op-Ed columns.
The ridicule was so widespread that finally even this White House had to blink. By midweek, it had abandoned that particularly ludicrous argument, if not its spurious larger claim that Mr. Cheney gets a free pass to ignore rules regulating federal officials' handling of government secrets.
That retreat might allow us to mark the end of this installment of the Bush-Cheney Follies but for one nagging problem: Not for the first time in the history of this administration — or the hundredth — has the real story been lost amid the Washington kerfuffle. Once the laughter subsides and you look deeper into the narrative leading up to the punch line, you can unearth a buried White House plot that is more damning than the official scandal. This plot once again snakes back to the sinister origins of the Iraq war, to the Valerie Wilson leak case and to the press failures that enabled the administration to abuse truth and the law for too long.
One journalist who hasn't failed is Mark Silva of The Chicago Tribune. He first reported more than a year ago, in May 2006, the essentials of the "news" at the heart of the recent Cheney ruckus. Mr. Silva found that the vice president was not filing required reports on his office's use of classified documents because he asserted that his role in the legislative branch, as president of the Senate, gave him an exemption.
This scoop went unnoticed by nearly everybody. It would still be forgotten today had not Henry Waxman, the dogged House inquisitor, called out Mr. Cheney 10 days ago, detailing still more egregious examples of the vice president's flouting of the law, including his effort to shut down an oversight agency in charge of policing him. The congressman's brief set off the firestorm that launched a thousand late-night gags.
That's all to the public good, but hiding in plain sight was the little-noted content of the Bush executive order that Mr. Cheney is accused of violating. On close examination, this obscure 2003 document, thrust into the light only because the vice president so blatantly defied it, turns out to be yet another piece of self-incriminating evidence illuminating the White House's guilt in ginning up its false case for war.
The tale of the document begins in August 2001, when the Bush administration initiated a review of the previous executive order on classified materials signed by Bill Clinton in 1995. The Clinton order had been acclaimed in its day as a victory for transparency because it mandated the automatic declassification of most government files after 25 years.
It was predictable that the obsessively secretive Bush team would undermine the Clinton order. What was once a measure to make government more open would be redrawn to do the opposite. And sure enough, when the White House finally released its revised version, the scant news coverage focused on how the new rules postponed the Clinton deadline for automatic declassification and tightened secrecy so much that previously declassified documents could be reclassified.
But few noticed another change inserted five times in the revised text: every provision that gave powers to the president over classified documents was amended to give the identical powers to the vice president. This unprecedented increase in vice-presidential clout, though spelled out in black and white, went virtually unremarked in contemporary news accounts.
Given all the other unprecedented prerogatives that President Bush has handed his vice president, this one might seem to be just more of the same. But both the timing of the executive order and the subsequent use Mr. Cheney would make of it reveal its special importance in the games that the White House played with prewar intelligence.
The obvious juncture for Mr. Bush to bestow these new powers on his vice president, you might expect, would have been soon after 9/11, especially since the review process on the Clinton order started a month earlier and could be expedited, as so much other governmental machinery was, to meet the urgent national-security crisis. Yet the new executive order languished for another 18 months, only to be published and signed with no fanfare on March 25, 2003, a week after the invasion of Iraq began.
Why then? It was throughout March, both on the eve of the war and right after "Shock and Awe," that the White House's most urgent case for Iraq's imminent threat began to unravel. That case had been built around the scariest of Saddam's supposed W.M.D., the nuclear weapons that could engulf America in mushroom clouds, and the White House had pushed it relentlessly, despite a lack of evidence. On "Meet the Press" on March 16, Mr. Cheney pressed that doomsday button one more time: "We believe he has, in fact, reconstituted nuclear weapons." But even as the vice president spoke, such claims were at last being strenuously challenged in public.
Nine days earlier Mohamed ElBaradei of the International Atomic Energy Agency had announced that documents supposedly attesting to Saddam's attempt to secure uranium in Niger were "not authentic." A then-obscure retired diplomat, Joseph Wilson, piped in on CNN, calling the case "outrageous."
Soon both Senator Jay Rockefeller of West Virginia and Congressman Waxman wrote letters (to the F.B.I. and the president, respectively) questioning whether we were going to war because of what Mr. Waxman labeled "a hoax." And this wasn't the only administration use of intelligence that was under increasing scrutiny. The newly formed 9/11 commission set its first open hearings for March 31 and requested some half-million documents, including those pertaining to what the White House knew about Al Qaeda's threat during the summer of 2001.
The new executive order that Mr. Bush signed on March 25 was ingenious. By giving Mr. Cheney the same classification powers he had, Mr. Bush gave his vice president a free hand to wield a clandestine weapon: he could use leaks to punish administration critics.
That weapon would be employed less than four months later. Under Mr. Bush's direction, Mr. Cheney deputized Scooter Libby to leak highly selective and misleading portions of a 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq to pet reporters as he tried to discredit Mr. Wilson. By then, Mr. Wilson had emerged as the most vocal former government official accusing the White House of not telling the truth before the war.
Because of the Patrick Fitzgerald investigation, we would learn three years later about the offensive conducted by Mr. Libby on behalf of Mr. Cheney and Mr. Bush. That revelation prompted the vice president to acknowledge his enhanced powers in an unguarded moment in a February 2006 interview with Brit Hume of Fox News. Asked by Mr. Hume with some incredulity if "a vice president has the authority to declassify information," Mr. Cheney replied, "There is an executive order to that effect." He was referring to the order of March 2003.
Even now, few have made the connection between this month's Cheney flap and the larger scandal. That larger scandal is to be found in what the vice president did legally under the executive order early on rather than in his more recent rejection of its oversight rules.
Timing really is everything. By March 2003, this White House knew its hype of Saddam's nonexistent nuclear arsenal was in grave danger of being exposed. The order allowed Mr. Bush to keep his own fingerprints off the nitty-gritty of any jihad against whistle-blowers by giving Mr. Cheney the authority to pick his own shots and handle the specifics. The president could have plausible deniability and was free to deliver non-denial denials like "If there is a leak out of my administration, I want to know who it is." Mr. Cheney in turn could delegate the actual dirty work to Mr. Libby, who obstructed justice to help throw a smoke screen over the vice president's own role in the effort to destroy Mr. Wilson.
Last week The Washington Post ran a first-rate investigative series on the entire Cheney vice presidency. Readers posting comments were largely enthusiastic, but a few griped. "Six and a half years too late," said one. "Four years late and billions of dollars short," said another. Such complaints reflect the bitter legacy of much of the Washington press's failure to penetrate the hyping of prewar intelligence and, later, the import of the Fitzgerald investigation.
We're still playing catch-up. In a week in which the C.I.A. belatedly released severely censored secrets about agency scandals dating back a half-century, you have to wonder what else was done behind the shield of an executive order signed just after the Ides of March four years ago. Another half-century could pass before Americans learn the full story of the secrets buried by Mr. Cheney and his boss to cover up their deceitful path to war.
http://select.nytimes.com/2007/07/01/opinion/01rich.html?_r=1&hp&oref=login
Transcript of ElBaradei's U.N. presentation
Friday, March 7, 2003 Posted: 12:39 PM EST (1739 GMT)
(CNN) -- Following is a transcript of International Atomic Energy Agency Director General Mohamed ElBaradei's March 7 presentation to the U.N. Security Council on the progress of the inspection effort in Iraq.
ElBaradei: Thank you, Mr. President.
Mr. President, my report to the council today is an update on the status of the International Atomic Energy Agency's nuclear verification activities in Iraq pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1441 and other relevant resolutions.
When I reported last to the council on February 14, I explained that the agency's inspection activities has moved well beyond the reconnaissance phase -- that is, re-establishing our knowledge base regarding Iraq nuclear capabilities -- into the investigative phase, which focuses on the central question before the IAEA relevant to disarmament -- whether Iraq has revived or attempted to revive its defunct nuclear weapons program over the last four years.
At the outset, let me state on general observation, namely that during the past four years at the majority of Iraqi sites industrial capacity has deteriorated substantially due to the departure of the foreign support that was often present in the late '80s, the departure of large numbers of skilled Iraqi personnel in the past decade and the lack of consistent maintenance by Iraq of sophisticated equipment.
At only a few inspected sites involved in industrial research, development and manufacturing have the facilities been improved and new personnel been taken on.
This overall deterioration in industrial capacity is naturally of direct relevance to Iraq's capability for resuming a nuclear weapons program.
The IAEA has now conducted a total of 218 nuclear inspections at 141 sites, including 21 that have not been inspected before. In addition, the agency experts have taken part in many joint UNMOVIC [U.N. Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission]-IAEA inspections.
Technical support for nuclear inspections has continued to expand. The three operational air samplers have collected from key locations in Iraq weekly air particulate samples that are being sent to laboratories for analysis. Additional results of water, sediment, vegetation and material sample analysis have been received from the relevant laboratories.
Our vehicle-borne radiation survey team has covered some 2,000 kilometers over the past three weeks. Survey access has been gained to over 75 facilities, including military garrisons and camps, weapons factories, truck parks and manufacturing facilities and residential areas.
Interviews have continued with relevant Iraqi personnel, at times with individuals and groups in the workplace during the course of unannounced inspections, and on other occasions in pre-arranged meetings with key scientists and other specialists known to have been involved with Iraq's past nuclear program.
The IAEA has continued to conduct interviews, even when the conditions were not in accordance with the IAEA-preferred modalities, with a view to gaining as much information as possible -- information that could be cross-checked for validity with other sources and which could be helpful in our assessment of areas under investigation.
As you may recall, when we first began to request private, unescorted interviews, the Iraqi interviewees insisted on taping the interviews and keeping the recorded tapes. Recently, upon our insistence, individuals have been consenting to being interviewed without escort and without a taped record. The IAEA has conducted two such private interviews in the last 10 days, and hope that its ability to conduct private interviews will continue unhindered, including possibly interviews outside Iraq.
I should add that we are looking into further refining the modalities for conducting interviews to ensure that they are conducted freely and to alleviate concerns that interviews are being listened to by other Iraqi parties. In our view, interviews outside Iraq may be the best way to ensure that interviews are free, and we intend therefore to request such interviews shortly.
We are also asking other states to enable us to conduct interviews with former Iraqi scientists that now reside in those states.
Mr. President, in the last few weeks, Iraq has provided a considerable volume of documentation relevant to the issues I reported earlier as being of particular concern, including Iraq's efforts to procure aluminum tubes, its attempted procurement of magnets and magnets-production capabilities and its reported attempt to import uranium.
I will touch briefly on the progress made on each of these issues.
Since my last update to the council, the primary technical focus of IAEA field activities in Iraq has been on resolving several outstanding issues related to the possible resumption of efforts by Iraq to enrich uranium through the use of centrifuge. For that purpose, the IAEA assembled a specially qualified team of international centrifuge manufacturing experts.
With regard to the aluminum tubes, the IAEA has conducted a thorough investigation of Iraq's attempt to purchase large quantities of high-strength aluminum tubes. As previously reported, Iraq has maintained that these aluminum tubes were sold for rocket production.
Extensive field investigation and document analysis have failed to uncover any evidence that Iraq intended to use these 81-millimeter tubes for any project other than the reverse engineering of rockets.
The Iraqi decision-making process with regard to the design of these rockets was well-documented. Iraq has provided copies of design documents, procurement records, minutes of committee meetings and supporting data and samples.
A thorough analysis of this information, together with information gathered from interviews with Iraqi personnel, has allowed the IAEA to develop a coherent picture of attempted purchase and intended usage of the 81-millimeter aluminum tubes as well as the rationale behind the changes in the tolerance.
Drawing on this information, the IAEA has learned that the original tolerance for the 81-millimeter tubes were set prior to 1987 and were based on physical measurements taken from a small number of imported rockets in Iraq's possession.
Initial attempts to reverse-engineer the rockets met with little success. Tolerance were adjusted during the following years as part of ongoing efforts to revitalize a project and improve operational efficiency. The project language for a long period during this time became the subject of several committees, which resulted in the specification and tolerance changes on each occasion.
Based on available evidence, the IAEA team has concluded that Iraq efforts to import these aluminum tubes were not likely to have been related to the manufacture of centrifuge, and moreover that it was highly unlikely that Iraq could have achieved the considerable redesign needed to use them in a revived centrifuge program.
However, this issue will continue to be scrutinized and investigated.
With respect to reports about Iraq efforts to import high-strength permanent magnets or to achieve the capability for producing such magnets for use in a centrifuge enrichment program, I should note that since 1998 Iraq has purchased high-strength magnets for various uses.
Iraq has declared inventories of magnets of 12 different designs. The IAEA has verified that previously acquired magnets have been used for missile guidance systems, industrial machinery, electricity meters and field telephones.
Through visits to research and production sites, review of engineering drawings and analysis of sample magnets, the IAEA experts familiar with the use of such magnets in centrifuge enrichment have verified that none of the magnets that Iraq has declared could be used directly for centrifuge magnetic bearings.
In June 2001, Iraq signed a contract for a new magnet production line for delivery and installation in 2003. The delivery has not yet occurred, and Iraqi documentations and interviews of Iraqi personnel indicate that this contract will not be executed.
However, they have concluded that the replacement of foreign procurement with domestic magnet production seems reasonable from an economic point of view.
In addition, the training and experience acquired by Iraq in pre-1991 period make it likely that Iraq possesses the expertise to manufacture high-strength permanent magnets suitable for use in enrichment centrifuges. The IAEA will continue, therefore, to monitor and inspect equipment and materials that could be used to make magnets for enrichment centrifuges.
With regard to uranium acquisition, the IAEA has made progress in its investigation into reports that Iraq sought to buy uranium from Niger in recent years. The investigation was centered on documents provided by a number of states that pointed to an agreement between Niger and Iraq for the sale of uranium between 1999 and 2001.
The IAEA has discussed these reports with the governments of Iraq and Israel, both of which have denied that any such activity took place.
For its part, Iraq has provided the IAEA with a comprehensive explanation of its relations with Niger and has described a visit by an Iraqi official to a number of African countries, including Niger in February 1999, which Iraq thought might have given rise to the reports.
The IAEA was able to review correspondence coming from various bodies of the government of Niger and to compare the form, format, contents and signature of that correspondence with those of the alleged procurement-related documentation.
Based on thorough analysis, the IAEA has concluded with the concurrence of outside experts that these documents which formed the basis for the report of recent uranium transaction between Iraq and Niger are in fact not authentic. We have therefore concluded that these specific allegations are unfounded. However, we will continue to follow up any additional evidence if it emerges relevant to efforts by Iraq to illicitly import nuclear materials.
Many concerns regarding Iraq's possible intention to resume its nuclear program have arisen from Iraq's procurement efforts reported by a number of states. In addition, many of Iraq's efforts to procure commodities and products, including magnets and aluminum tubes, have been conducted in contravention of the sanctions specified under Security Council Resolution 661 and other relevant resolutions.
The issue of procurement efforts remains under thorough investigation, and further verification will be forthcoming. In fact, an IAEA team of technical experts is currently in Iraq, composed of custom investigators and computer forensics specialists, to conduct a -- which is conducting a series of investigations [through] inspection of trading companies and commercial organizations aimed at understanding Iraq's pattern of procurement.
Mr. President, in conclusion, I am able to report today that in the area of nuclear weapons, the most lethal weapons of mass destruction, inspections in Iraq are moving forward.
Since the resumption of inspection a little over three months ago, and particularly during the three weeks since my last ordered report to the council, the IAEA has made important progress in identifying what nuclear-related capabilities remain in Iraq and in its assessment of whether Iraq has made any effort to revive its past nuclear program during the intervening four years since inspections were brought to a halt.
At this stage, the following can be stated:
One, there is no indication of resumed nuclear activities in those buildings that were identified through the use of satellite imagery as being reconstructed or newly erected since 1998, nor any indication of nuclear-related prohibited activities at any inspected sites.
Second, there is no indication that Iraq has attempted to import uranium since 1990.
Three, there is no indication that Iraq has attempted to import aluminum tubes for use in centrifuge enrichment. Moreover, even had Iraq pursued such a plan, it would have encountered practical difficulties in manufacturing centrifuge out of the aluminum tubes in question.
Fourth, although we are still reviewing issues related to magnets and magnet-production, there is no indication to date that Iraq imported magnets for use in centrifuge enrichment program.
As I stated above, the IAEA will naturally continue further to scrutinize and investigate all of the above issues.
After three months of intrusive inspections, we have to date found no evidence or plausible indication of the revival of a nuclear weapon program in Iraq.
We intend to continue our inspection activities, making use of all additional rights granted to us by Resolution 1441 and all additional tools that might be available to us, including reconnaissance platforms and all relevant technologies.
We also hope to continue to receive from states actionable information relevant to our mandate.
I should note that in the past three weeks, possibly as a result of ever-increasing pressure by the international community, Iraq has been forthcoming in its cooperation, particularly with regard to the conduct of private interviews and in making available evidence that could contribute to the resolution of matters of IAEA concern. I do hope that Iraq will continue to expand the scope and accelerate the pace of its cooperation.
The detailed knowledge of Iraq capabilities that IAEA experts have accumulated since 1991, combined with the extended rights provided by Resolution 1441, the active commitment by all states to help us fulfill our mandate and the recently increased level of Iraqi cooperation should enable us in the near future to provide the Security Council with an objective and thorough assessment of Iraq's nuclear-related capabilities.
However, credible this assessment may be, we will endeavor, in view of the inherent uncertainties associated with any verification process, and particularly in the light of Iraq past record of cooperation, to evaluate Iraq capabilities on a continuous basis as part of our long-term monitoring and verification program in order to provide the international community with ongoing and real-time assurances.
Thank you, Mr. President.
http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/03/07/sprj.irq.un.transcript.elbaradei/
CNN SATURDAY
Interview With Joseph Wilson
Aired March 8, 2003 - 15:00 ET
THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.
RENAY SAN MIGUEL, CNN ANCHOR: Diplomats are burning up the phone lines today trying to win votes for or against the latest U.N. resolution on Iraq. The resolution would give Iraq until March 17 to disarm or be disarmed by force. Richard Roth joins us now from the United Nations -- Richard.
RICHARD ROTH, CNN SR. U.N. CORRESPONDENT: Yes, President Bush is going to start making calls on Monday. He made a call to Chile's president on Friday. Chile, one of the undecided six, so-called swing votes that remain on the Security Council. And it's going to be hard in the next couple of days to find out exactly where countries are leaning, because the U.S., you never know, could make changes to the resolution yet again.
Friday, some amendments added, basically a big deadline added. March 17, for Iraq to turn over all of its weapons of mass destruction.
Here at the United Nations, it's quiet, but phone calls are being made around the world. The French foreign minister, Dominique de Villepin, is traveling to three African countries, the three swing African votes, Guinea, Cameroon, Angola. Angola's representative yesterday said he wasn't really happy with the draft resolution. Angola and Chile believing that Iraq should be given more time, that the 17th of March just comes up too soon.
The U.S. says it could call for a vote as early as Tuesday, which would give Iraq less than a week to turn over weapons of mass destruction. The impact of such a deadline on the weapons inspectors certainly would give them less time to be in the country to certify that Iraq is in the clear.
(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)
MOHAMED ELBARADEI, DIRECTOR GENERAL, IAEA: On the one hand, there is a lot of indication in the intelligence community that there are -- Iraq still has chemical and biological weapons. On the other hand, none of the inspectors are able to find any of these weapons. So there is no smoking gun.
(END VIDEO CLIP)
ROTH: That's Mohamed ElBaradei of the International Atomic Energy Agency saying that the weapons inspectors on his side and Dr. Blix have not found a smoking gun, that Iraq is beginning to cooperating more. And as for the war, well, it means that they will never be able to certify with certainty that Iraq's nuclear program has not been revived, though there are no indications right now about that.
What else is Mr. ElBaradei reporting to the Security Council? Well, it drew little notice, because of the high powered debate and arguments among the big powers, but the director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency reported that his group has certified that documents provided by countries that allege possibly that the Iraqis were doing deals with the African nation of Niger to get enriched uranium for nuclear production were fakes, were forgeries. They refused to say whether it was the U.S. that gave them all the documents or Britain, but they're just saying what they were given to examine shows no confirmation that Iraq, as President Bush alleged in his State of the Union address, was getting enriched uranium in a potential deal with the African nation of Niger -- Renay.
SAN MIGUEL: Well, Richard, back in the region that we're talking about here, there are reports that the United Nations is pulling out some of its observers from Kuwait?
ROTH: That's right. Civilian staff being moved away while the U.N. mission along the Iraq/Kuwait Demilitarized Zone remains in place. The U.N. operation there is called UNICOM (ph), and you're going to see this over the next few days. The United Nations humanitarian team has been pared down dramatically in Iraq. Basically, UNICOM's (ph) 195 observers will stay in place the 775th Bangladeshi military support unit will be there.
Also of note along that demilitarized zone, in the last few days, civilians, said to be Kuwaiti construction workers, but some Marines in the area, cutting holes in the fence, an electric fence along that border, holes as wide as 75 feet. You can certainly bring a lot of big military vehicles through that, and also perhaps 75 gaps in all.
The U.N. reported this as a violation of the Security Council resolution. It's up to the Security Council what to do with it. The U.S. defends this action. If there's any link to the U.S. government, and no doubt there is, because they say Iraq has been a threat to Kuwait for more than 12 years. Stay tuned -- Renay.
SAN MIGUEL: As we certainly will. Richard Roth, thank you very much.
Now, as Richard just said, during his report yesterday, Mohamed ElBaradei said some of the evidence that Secretary of State Colin Powell presented to the U.N. was apparently faked. Joining us now from our Washington bureau is Joseph Wilson, who was acting ambassador to Iraq when the first Gulf War began. Mr. Wilson, thank you so much for joining us today.
JOSEPH WILSON, FORMER AMB. TO IRAQ: Hi, Renay. How are you.
SAN MIGUEL: Just fine. How could this happen? It is the perception that documents like these are vetted to within an inch of their life by intelligence agencies. How do you think this managed to slip by? WILSON: Well, this particular case is outrageous. I actually started my foreign service career in Niger and ended my foreign service career doing -- in charge of Africa in the Clinton White House. We know a lot about the uranium business in Niger, and for something like this to go unchallenged by U.S. -- the U.S. government is just simply stupid. It would have taken a couple of phone calls. We have had an embassy there since the early '60s. All this stuff is open. It's a restricted market of buyers and sellers. The Nigerians (sic) have always been very open with us.
For this to have gotten to the IAEA is on the face of it dumb, but more to the point, it taints the whole rest of the case that the government is trying to build against Iraq.
SAN MIGUEL: I was just going to ask you, I mean, I got the idea from your answer about this, but just how damaging is this to the U.S. case with the stakes being as high as they are?
WILSON: Well, you know what it's like when you go into court. A prosecutor comes up with some evidence that is obviously false, it casts doubt on every other bit of evidence that he produces. And I think it's safe to say that the U.S. government should have or did know that this report was a fake before Dr. ElBaradei mentioned it in his report at the U.N. yesterday.
SAN MIGUEL: There's also another courtroom saying that, you know, lawyers like to say, never ask a question that you don't know the answer to. That could play into this as well.
But Mr. ElBaradei did tell our Richard Roth today, during an interview, that the intelligence isn't just coming from the U.S., that there were other countries involved. Which other countries do you think, and how is it that all of these intelligence agencies or intelligence agencies from these countries that were involved could be taken in by these forgeries?
WILSON: Well, the report I saw said that the Brits were involved. Maybe it was the British that passed this report on. I don't know who else might have been involved, but I can tell you this: The report in "The Washington Post" today said -- quoted a U.S. official as saying, "we just fell for it."
That's just not good enough. Either he's being disingenuous, or he shouldn't be drawing a government paycheck.
SAN MIGUEL: So how do you play this, then? I mean, what, do you admit it, do you just move on? Do you try to get these things verified if you do believe, indeed, that Iraq was trying to buy this material from Niger? I mean, how do you handle this? What's the damage control on this?
WILSON: I have no idea. I'm not in the government. I would not want to be doing damage control on this. I think you probably just fess up and try to move on and say there's sufficient other evidence to convict Saddam of being involved in the nuclear arms trade. But Dr. ElBaradei yesterday was pretty clear. He doesn't see that this is happening.
SAN MIGUEL: We'll have to leave it there. Joseph Wilson, former acting ambassador to Iraq for the U.S., thank you very much for your time.
WILSON: Good to be with you.
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http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0303/08/cst.07.html
Bush Faced Dwindling Data on Iraq Nuclear Bid
By Walter Pincus
Washington Post Staff Writer
Wednesday, July 16, 2003; Page A01
In recent days, as the Bush administration has defended its assertion in the president's State of the Union address that Iraq had tried to buy African uranium, officials have said it was only one bit of intelligence that indicated former Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein was reconstituting his nuclear weapons program.
But a review of speeches and reports, plus interviews with present and former administration officials and intelligence analysts, suggests that between Oct. 7, when President Bush made a speech laying out the case for military action against Hussein, and Jan. 28, when he gave his State of the Union address, almost all the other evidence had either been undercut or disproved by U.N. inspectors in Iraq.
In a speech making a case for military action against Iraq, President Bush cited Iraq's attempts to buy aluminum tubes for centrifuges used to enrich uranium. (State Department Photo Via AP)
By Jan. 28, in fact, the intelligence report concerning Iraqi attempts to buy uranium from Africa -- although now almost entirely disproved -- was the only publicly unchallenged element of the administration's case that Iraq had restarted its nuclear program. That may explain why the administration strived to keep the information in the speech and attribute it to the British, even though the CIA had challenged it earlier.
For example, in his Oct. 7 speech, Bush said that "satellite photographs reveal that Iraq is rebuilding facilities at [past nuclear] sites." He also cited Hussein's "numerous meetings with Iraqi nuclear scientists" as further evidence that the program was being reconstituted, along with Iraq's attempts to buy high-strength aluminum tubes "needed" for centrifuges used to enrich uranium.
But on Jan. 27 -- the day before the State of the Union address -- the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported to the U.N. Security Council that two months of inspections in Iraq had found that no prohibited nuclear activities had taken place at former Iraqi nuclear sites. As for Iraqi nuclear scientists, Mohamed ElBaradei told the Security Council, U.N. inspectors had "useful" interviews with some of them, though not in private. And preliminary analysis, he said, suggested that the aluminum tubes, "unless modified, would not be suitable for manufacturing centrifuges."
The next night, Bush delivered his speech, including the now-controversial 16-word sentence, "The British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa."
Of his October examples, only the aluminum tubes charge remained in January, but that allegation had a subtle caveat -- he described the tubes as merely "suitable" for nuclear weapons production. Without the statement on uranium, the allegation concerning aluminum tubes would have been the only nuclear-related action ascribed to Hussein since the early 1990s.
And the tubes had already been questioned not only by IAEA, but also by analysts in U.S. and British intelligence agencies.
The idea that Iraq was acquiring tubes for a nuclear program became public in September, shortly after the Bush administration began a campaign to marshal public, congressional and U.N. support for authority to attack Iraq if it did not disarm.
On Aug. 26, Vice President Cheney, the official most publicly vocal about Iraq as a nuclear threat, began the campaign when he told a Veterans of Foreign Wars audience: "Many of us are convinced that Saddam will acquire nuclear weapons fairly soon. Just how soon we cannot gauge."
On Sept. 8, the New York Times disclosed that intelligence showed that Iraq had "embarked on a worldwide hunt for materials to make an atomic bomb" by trying to purchase "specially designed aluminum tubes" that unidentified administration sources believed were for centrifuges to enrich uranium.
The story referred to Bush "hardliners" who argued that action should be taken because if they waited for proof that Hussein had a nuclear weapon, "the first sign of a smoking gun may be a mushroom cloud."
That day, Bush national security adviser Condoleezza Rice appeared on CNN's "Late Edition" and confirmed the Times story. She said the tubes "are only really suited for nuclear weapons programs, centrifuge programs." She also said, "The problem here is that there will always be some uncertainty about how quickly he can acquire nuclear weapons, but we don't want the smoking gun to be a mushroom cloud."
Cheney also confirmed the Times story that day, on NBC's "Meet the Press," saying that "we don't have all the evidence," but enough of a picture "that tells us that he [Hussein] is in fact actively and aggressively seeking to acquire nuclear weapons."
What neither Rice nor Cheney said at the time was that Baghdad's first attempts to purchase the aluminum tubes, more than a year earlier, had by Sept. 8 led to a fairly open disagreement in the U.S. intelligence community on whether the tubes were for centrifuges or for artillery rockets in Iraq's military program.
Analysts from the State and Energy departments said the tubes were too long and too thick for centrifuges; CIA and Pentagon analysts said they could be cut down and reamed out. Their debate was continuing as the agencies were putting together the still-classified national intelligence estimate on Hussein's weapons program.
In July, the United States had intercepted one shipment and obtained a tube; it was coated with a protective chemical that would have had to be removed if it were to be put to a nuclear purpose.
The intelligence estimate, completed in mid-September, reflected the different views, but the final judgment said that "most" analysts leaned toward the view that the tubes had a nuclear purpose. When the British dossier on Iraq's weapons program was published on Sept. 24, it referred to the tubes, but noted that "there is no definitive intelligence that it is destined for a nuclear program."
In his State of the Union address, Bush did not indicate any disagreement over the use of the tubes. Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, however, outlined the arguments involved when he spoke eight days later before the Security Council, where inspectors already had challenged the U.S. position on them.
On March 7, ElBaradei gave his final report to the Security Council before his inspectors were removed from Iraq on March 18. His conclusion was that "the IAEA had found no evidence or plausible indication of the revival of a nuclear weapons program in Iraq." He also said the documents that gave rise to the allegation that Iraq had tried to buy African uranium were forged.
On March 16, Cheney appeared again on "Meet the Press" and reiterated his views of the previous August about Hussein's nuclear program. "We know he's been absolutely devoted to trying to acquire nuclear weapons, and we believe he has, in fact, reconstituted nuclear weapons." The war began three days later.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A61622-2003Jul15
Goldman Sachs tops M&A league tables
5:00AM Thursday July 05, 2007
By Liam Dann
The sale of Telecom's Yellow Pages and the purchase of Formica by Fletcher Building contributed to a 16 per cent increase in merger and acquisition activity for the first half of 2007 compared to the same period a year earlier.
By value, local M&A deals announced in the period were worth US$5.5 billion, figures released by Thomson Financial show.
Goldman Sachs JBWere topped the investment banking league tables, having worked on the Yellow Pages sale and the purchase of Formica. Those deals were worth US$1.6 billion ($2.04 billion) and US$750 ($960 million) respectively.
Second on the list was ABN Amro, who also worked on Yellow Pages and the sale of Canwest Media Works to private equity firm Ironbridge.
That deal was worth US$536 million ($685 million).
Goldman Sachs JBWere co-head of investment banking Andrew Barclay said his firm's position at the top of the tables reflected its traditionally strong position as a global leader in investment banking. Goldman Sachs also took the top spot for worldwide for financial advisory work during the first half of this year.
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/section/3/story.cfm?c_id=3&objectid=10449720
FBI Probe Threat to Goldman Sachs
By THE ASSOCIATED PRESS
Published: July 6, 2007
Filed at 5:21 p.m. ET
NEW YORK (AP) -- The FBI is investigating anonymous mailed threats against the Goldman Sachs investment firm but does not consider the warnings to be of ''high credibility,'' an investigator said Friday.
The letters, handwritten in red ink on loose-leaf paper and signed ''A.Q.U.S.A.,'' were mailed to 20 newspapers, authorities said. The letters contained the warning: ''Hundreds will die. We are inside. You cannot stop us.''
A federal law enforcement official familiar with the investigation told the AP that the FBI ''does not assign high credibility to the threat'' because of the circumstances surrounding the letters, including their brevity and the nonspecific nature of the threat. The investigator spoke on condition of anonymity.
Michael DuVally, a Goldman Sachs spokesman, said the firm was working closely with law enforcement authorities, adding that authorities told the firm they don't believe the threat is credible.
http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/us/AP-Goldman-Sachs-Threat.html
USA. NOAA update predicts above normal hurricane season
Friday, 10 August 2007
NOAA's Climate Prediction Center has released its update to the 2007 Atlantic Hurricane Season Outlook, maintaining its expectations for an above normal season.
As we enter the peak months (August through October) of the Atlantic hurricane season, NOAA scientists are predicting an 85 percent chance of an above-normal season, with the likelihood of 13 to 16 named storms, with seven to nine becoming hurricanes, of which three to five could become major hurricanes (Category 3 strength or higher on the Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Scale).
http://www.bymnews.com/news/newsDetails.php?id=13606
UBS Cuts BP Target On Thunder Horse; Buy
Tuesday, September 19, 2006 3:25:47 AM ET
Dow Jones Newswires
0609 GMT [Dow Jones] UBS lowers BP (BP.ISE) target to 700p from 715p following news of delays in production at its Thunder Horse project. Says the net effect of the Thunder Horse and Prudhoe Bay adjustments to forecasts is a 5% cut to EPS, now expects '06 EPS to come in at 1.11p, '07 EPS at 1.27p, and '08 EPS at 1.38p, with just under half of the cut relating to Thunder Horse. However, believes the impact of this is already in the price, thus reiterates buy rating. Shares closed Monday at 579p. (PBA)
http://www.newratings.com/analyst_news/article_1370863.html
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