...There were five DS agents at the Mission compound that night. Two had traveled from Tripoli with U.S. Ambassador to Libya Christopher Stevens (who was staying at the Mission compound in Benghazi), and three others were assigned to the Mission facility. In addition to the five DS agents on duty, there were three armed members of the Libyan 17th February Brigade militia, three Libyan National Police officers, and five unarmed members of a local security team comtacted through a British company, Blue Mountain Group, who were guarding the Mission facility that night. In addition, six armed CIA security personnel (plus an
interpreter) operating out of the nearby Annex were able to respond quickly afterreceiving word of the attack. ...
There was a 3 to 1 ratio of attackers to security personnel.
There is no accountability of the actions Congress took in cutting funding to the State Department in the Senate report either. The Senate took good care of themselves in their assessment.
By , Staff writer
April 23, 2010
Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton (click here) did not stand alone when she objected this week to a Senate Budget Committee plan to take much of a nearly $10 billion cut in President Obama’s proposed discretionary spending for next year from State Department and other international programs....
Some of the accounting by the Senate report is rather astounding. The Annex was notified of the attack yet it took 25 minutes for them to respond because then had to ready two armored vehicles before departing the annex. The vehicles weren't ready at a moment's notice? What was so difficult to respond immediately?
The attack occurred at 9:40 PM.
During the period between approximately 9:40 p.m. and 10:03 p.m. Benghazi time, the Chief of Base and security team members attempted to secure assistance and heavy weapons (such as .50 caliber truck-mounted machine guns) from the 17th February Brigade and other militias that had been assisting the United States.
The personnel in Libya never prepared for this possibility. They were attempting to respond DURING the attack, but, they didn't have the equipment needed to defend the consulate. This is NOT a State Department issue. The funding was cut and there were personnel on the ground in Libya that were absolutely not prepared for the attack. They were scrambling for resources. What good is a security team if there is no munitions to use to secure the facility?
...some members of the security team expressed frustration that they were
unable to respond more quickly to the Mission compound...
Sounds right.
...Other DS agents went to retrieve their M-4 carbine assault rifles from
Building B when the attack began....
No personnel were prepared for defending the consulate. Just that simple. They never expected to face this kind of danger. Now, if they never expected this kind of danger, than why all the unheeded warnings? If there were so many warnings about the dangers to the consulate and the ambassador why was the security personnel completely unprepared to defend themselves and the consulate?
Why?
...The 17th February Brigade members refused, saying they preferred to negotiate with the attackers instead....
There also was no clear understanding there was a single commander that all the security forces would take orders from, the command structure disintegrated at the time of the attack. The militia did not value the Ambassador enough to put their lives on the line for him. There were a variety of value systems within the security personnel, why would anyone expect there to be a sincere effort to defend from the attack? The militia that were relied upon had completely different value systems than the other security personnel. The hosting country is suppose to provide security to State Department personnel. That is established protocol within any consulate mission. The militias were assigned to this consulate and they did not see the need to defend the Ambassador above all else.
The Ambassador and two others, one being an armed DS agent, were in the 'safe room' of the consulate when they were overcome by smoke from burning diesel fuel. The DS agent lost the other two, including Ambassador Stevens in the smoke. When the smoke entered the safe room it was too late to save anyone because they were all overcome by it. The one DS agent that made it out of the room through a window nearly died as well. It was over long before anyone from the Annex began to search for the Ambassador.
...At approximately 11 :56 p.m. Benghazi time, sporadic arms fire and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) were fired at the Annex.28 Over the next hour, the Annex took sporadic small arms fire and RPG rounds, the security team returned fire, and the attackers dispersed....
End of discussion. The security team at Benghazi was not prepared to defend the compound. At 11:56 PM when they finally were organized with their weapons they deflected the second wave attack and ended the confrontation. This is not about having enough security personnel on the ground in Benghazi, this was the fact the security personnel there were not prepared to defend the consulate or the Ambassador. When they were organized to fire back at the attackers it was successful. What else is needed to know?
There were approximately 60 attackers at any point during the gun fire. There were 21 security personnel at the consulate. There were an additional five armed CIA agents at the Annex. There was absolutely no preparation for an attack on that consulate; even the vehicles were not prepared to respond. This is not a State Department issue, it is a command and control issue. No one was prepared for the attack. No one. Twenty-six security personnel, including the 5 CIA agents were not prepared to stop 60 attackers armed with small arms and diesel fuel.
interpreter) operating out of the nearby Annex were able to respond quickly afterreceiving word of the attack. ...
There was a 3 to 1 ratio of attackers to security personnel.
There is no accountability of the actions Congress took in cutting funding to the State Department in the Senate report either. The Senate took good care of themselves in their assessment.
By , Staff writer
April 23, 2010
Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton (click here) did not stand alone when she objected this week to a Senate Budget Committee plan to take much of a nearly $10 billion cut in President Obama’s proposed discretionary spending for next year from State Department and other international programs....
Some of the accounting by the Senate report is rather astounding. The Annex was notified of the attack yet it took 25 minutes for them to respond because then had to ready two armored vehicles before departing the annex. The vehicles weren't ready at a moment's notice? What was so difficult to respond immediately?
The attack occurred at 9:40 PM.
During the period between approximately 9:40 p.m. and 10:03 p.m. Benghazi time, the Chief of Base and security team members attempted to secure assistance and heavy weapons (such as .50 caliber truck-mounted machine guns) from the 17th February Brigade and other militias that had been assisting the United States.
The personnel in Libya never prepared for this possibility. They were attempting to respond DURING the attack, but, they didn't have the equipment needed to defend the consulate. This is NOT a State Department issue. The funding was cut and there were personnel on the ground in Libya that were absolutely not prepared for the attack. They were scrambling for resources. What good is a security team if there is no munitions to use to secure the facility?
...some members of the security team expressed frustration that they were
unable to respond more quickly to the Mission compound...
Sounds right.
...Other DS agents went to retrieve their M-4 carbine assault rifles from
Building B when the attack began....
No personnel were prepared for defending the consulate. Just that simple. They never expected to face this kind of danger. Now, if they never expected this kind of danger, than why all the unheeded warnings? If there were so many warnings about the dangers to the consulate and the ambassador why was the security personnel completely unprepared to defend themselves and the consulate?
Why?
...The 17th February Brigade members refused, saying they preferred to negotiate with the attackers instead....
There also was no clear understanding there was a single commander that all the security forces would take orders from, the command structure disintegrated at the time of the attack. The militia did not value the Ambassador enough to put their lives on the line for him. There were a variety of value systems within the security personnel, why would anyone expect there to be a sincere effort to defend from the attack? The militia that were relied upon had completely different value systems than the other security personnel. The hosting country is suppose to provide security to State Department personnel. That is established protocol within any consulate mission. The militias were assigned to this consulate and they did not see the need to defend the Ambassador above all else.
The Ambassador and two others, one being an armed DS agent, were in the 'safe room' of the consulate when they were overcome by smoke from burning diesel fuel. The DS agent lost the other two, including Ambassador Stevens in the smoke. When the smoke entered the safe room it was too late to save anyone because they were all overcome by it. The one DS agent that made it out of the room through a window nearly died as well. It was over long before anyone from the Annex began to search for the Ambassador.
...At approximately 11 :56 p.m. Benghazi time, sporadic arms fire and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) were fired at the Annex.28 Over the next hour, the Annex took sporadic small arms fire and RPG rounds, the security team returned fire, and the attackers dispersed....
End of discussion. The security team at Benghazi was not prepared to defend the compound. At 11:56 PM when they finally were organized with their weapons they deflected the second wave attack and ended the confrontation. This is not about having enough security personnel on the ground in Benghazi, this was the fact the security personnel there were not prepared to defend the consulate or the Ambassador. When they were organized to fire back at the attackers it was successful. What else is needed to know?
There were approximately 60 attackers at any point during the gun fire. There were 21 security personnel at the consulate. There were an additional five armed CIA agents at the Annex. There was absolutely no preparation for an attack on that consulate; even the vehicles were not prepared to respond. This is not a State Department issue, it is a command and control issue. No one was prepared for the attack. No one. Twenty-six security personnel, including the 5 CIA agents were not prepared to stop 60 attackers armed with small arms and diesel fuel.
