If India becomes a 'nuclear dealer' no other country will need the USA anymore. Arguably no other country will need Russia anymore. If India becomes a 'nuke dealer' than every country in the Middle East will have it's own reactor along with their own nuclear arsenal.
India cannot be allowed to deal in nuclear technology. It would destroy any all chances of nuclear disarmament of not only the Middle East but eventually, and this according to the Non-Proliferation Treaty which India refuses to sign, the 'five legal' nuclear nations will never disarm.
N-deal: India racing to get IAEA, NSG stamp (click here) - where it states 'videos' click on "Bush calls PM on nuke deal." I don't believe the USA legislature has even approved of this arrangement. Bush is pushing it as if it's a done deal.
NEW DELHI: While Prime Minister Manmohan Singh prepares to address Parliament on Monday on the 123 nuclear pact, the government's deal makers are working to a punishing schedule to ensure the 45-member Nuclear Suppliers' Group’s waiver to India is wrapped up in time for the accord to roll out within the Bush administration's lifespan.
The realisation in New Delhi that the deal, attacked by non-proliferationists in US and Opposition in India, stands its best chance till president George Bush is in office, has seen Indian negotiators focussing attention on IAEA as a safeguard agreement with the organisation is needed before the NSG exception.
It is only when the safeguard protocol for Indian civilian nuclear facilities is worked out that the NSG can consider a request for permitting its members to engage in nuclear commerce with India even though its strategic facilities will be outside any sort of international inspection. The safety protocol with the Vienna-based organisation is largely negotiated by the Department of Atomic Energy....
This is big money. Who gets the international contracts? All this mess is about 'status' and Bush's desire to exploit currently peaceful/conventional weaponed nations for wealth. Power has little to do with it, there is more national security for every nation WITHOUT nuclear proliferation than with it.
Russia vows strong support in NSG (click here)
Vladimir Radyuhin
MOSCOW: Russia will strongly support India on the lifting of nuclear cooperation curbs in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), and will not wait for an NSG waiver to sign an accord with India for building four additional reactors at the Koodankulam power plant,
India’s special envoy Shyam Saran said: “We can certainly sign an inter-governmental agreement with Russia before negotiating deals with the NSG [Nuclear Suppliers Group] and the IAEA,” the special envoy told The Hindu here on Tuesday after meeting Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov.
Russia is the first country Mr. Saran visited as part of India’s effort to marshal support from key members of the NSG for the removal of sanctions against India. From Russia, the special envoy will go to Germany, Brazil and Argentina. Mr. Saran said the Russian Foreign Minister vowed to give India strong support in the coming NSG debate....
Nuclear Suppliers Group (click here)
ProvisionsTHe Nuclear Suppliers' Group consists of 30 nuclear suppliers and seeks to control exports of nuclear materials, equipment, and technology, both dual-use and specially designed and prepared. Russia is a member of this group and therefore bound by its controls, though other former Soviet nuclear republics -- particularly Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan -- along with other major suppliers like China and Brazil are not. The United States views observance of the NSG guidelines by these states as an important means of stemming the flow of nuclear materials and technologies.
The NSG Guidelines include a number of important conditions that help promote nuclear cooperation under sound nonproliferation arrangements. For Trigger List exports, the NSG Guidelines currently require, for example, (1) an agreement between the International Atomic Energy Agency and the recipient state requiring the application of safeguards on all fissionable materials in its nuclear activities (also known as "full-scope IAEA safeguards") -- not just on the exported items, (2) physical protection against unauthorized use of transferred materials and facilities, and (3) restraint in the transfer of sensitive facilities, technology, and weapons-usable materials, i.e., exports that could contribute to the acquisition of plutonium or highly enriched unranium.
In 1992, spurred on by revelations about Iraq's illicit nuclear weapons program, the NSG adopted controls on nuclear-related dual-use goods, for example those with both nuclear and non-nuclear applications, that could make a major contribution to unsafeguarded nuclear activities or to nuclear explosive activities. The NSG Dual-Use Guidelines prohibit the transfer of controlled items for use in a non-nuclear weapon state in a nuclear explosive activity or an unsafeguarded nuclear fuel-cycle activity, or when there is an unacceptable risk of diversion to such an activity. To reduce the risk of diversion, the Guidelines require recipients to provide assurances 1) specifying how transferred items will be used, 2) stating that they will not be used for proscribed activities, and 3) stating that the suppliers consent will be obtained before any retransfers of the items. The NSG also agreed to control technology related to both Trigger List and controlled dual-use goods. By controlling technical information and assistance for the development, production, and use of controlled goods, NSG members limit the ability of proliferant states to use technical expertise or blueprints as part of a nuclear weapons program.
StatusThe United States proposed the formation of a Nuclear Suppliers Group following the 1974 nuclear explosion by India. The primary purpose was to ensure that suppliers uniformly applied a comprehensive set of guidelines to ensure that nuclear cooperation did not contribute to proliferation, and to involve a key non-NPT supplier, France. The NSG grew from seven to 15 countries by early 1978 when its guidelines and control list were published. The first 15 NSG members exchanged bilateral notes accepting the guidelines and control list and communicated these commitments to the IAEA Director General.
NSG members encourage all countries to adhere to the NSG Guidelines as the basis for responsible nuclear export policy. New members must adhere to the guidelines and are accepted as members only upon the unanimous agreement of all current members. Although suppliers consulted regularly on a bilateral basis, the NSG did not meet throughout the 1980s....
