August 30. 2018
By Frank A. Rose

Over the past several months, (click here) experts—including myself—have called on the Trump administration to extend the U.S.-Russia New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START). Extending the treaty by five years, as the agreement allows, helps maintain predictability and strategic stability with Russia, among other benefits. However, many of those same experts have also called for the cancellation of several U.S. nuclear delivery systems, in particular the Long-Range Stand-Off (LRSO) nuclear cruise missile and the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) intercontinental ballistic missile. At the same time, recent press reports indicate that senior members of the Trump administration are long-standing opponents of New START, placing the prospects for the treaty’s extension in doubt.

Given these dynamics, it is useful to review the historical relationship between New START and the U.S. strategic nuclear modernization program. It is clear to me that the two issues are linked. Indeed, it is hard to see how the Obama administration would have been able to obtain Senate support to ratify New START had it not agreed to modernize the U.S. triad of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and the supporting Department of Energy (DOE) nuclear infrastructure. On the other hand, it is difficult to imagine that the current bipartisan consensus on strategic modernization would have been achieved without New START or a similar arms control agreement....