FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION
1. The attacks in Benghazi were security-related, resulting in the deaths of our U.S. personnel after terrorists attacked two separate U.S. government facilities–the Special Mission compound (SMC) and the Annex.
Identification of the perpetrators and their motivations are the subject of an ongoing FBI criminal investigation. The Board concluded that no protest took place before the Special Mission and Annex attacks, which were unanticipated in their scale and intensity.
ADEQUACY OF SECURITY SYSTEMS AND PROCEDURES PRIOR TO SEPTEMBER 11, 2012
2. Systemic failures and leadership and management deficiencies at senior levels within two bureaus of the State Department resulted in a Special Mission security posture that was inadequate for Benghazi and grossly inadequate to deal with the attack that took place. Through the course of its inquiry, the Board interviewed over 100 individuals, reviewed thousands of pages of documents, and viewed hours of video footage. On the basis of its comprehensive review of this information, the Board remains fully convinced that responsibility for the tragic loss of life, injuries, and damage to U.S. facilities and property rests solely and completely with the terrorists who perpetrated the attack.
If there were no attacks there would be no deaths, however, the facility fell short from my point of view. Facility insufficiency is a KNOWN characteristic of danger to human life in the State Department. That aspect of our foreign service has a long history.
The facility was housing fuel in barrels. It was set up for failure. If the barrels were in their own secure storage there would be no deaths due to smoke inhalation. Where there exist this level of rudimentary danger it is possible to make the facility safer. Was there danger of deaths without the unsecured fuel? Every indication is that the personnel had control over the safe room. The terrorists never opened the room or secured the Ambassador away from his security. I suppose there is a percent of chance the safe room was not sincerely safe without the smoke, as the smoke would drive off the terrorists as well, but that is complete speculation and the facts don't point to that potential. Communication with support forces was horrible. It is questionable whether local forces would ever respond to calls from the Ambassador. In that lies the greatest danger. The consulate staff was invested in additional support at the other end of a phone call. That support was never forthcoming.
There is a real question about the efficacy of the foreign service that these deaths remind us. Should the foreign service be self-contained as are the recommendations within this report? Is the mission of the foreign service impacted by the idea of a mission that is a fortress? That is why the State Department was invested in hiring bodyguards. It protected the person who were invaluable beyond reason. The dedication of our foreign service is unquestionably perfect. They are beyond perfect. They cannot be replaced.
One of the aspects that cannot be ignored is what aspect of our fortification of our embassies and consulates actually turns into a liability to the purpose and outcomes of their mission? What can be done to tone down the fortifications without compromising safety of our personnel?
Overriding Factors
This is not to say, however, that there are no lessons to be learned. A recurring theme throughout the Board’s work was one also touched upon by the Nairobi and Dar es Salaam ARBs in 1999. Simply put, in the months leading up to September 11, 2012, security in Benghazi was not recognized and implemented as a “shared responsibility” in Washington, resulting in stove-piped discussions and decisions on policy and security. Key decisions, such as the extension of the State Department presence in Benghazi until December 2012, or non-decisions in Washington, such as the failure to establish standards for Benghazi and to meet them, or the lack of a cohesive staffing plan, essentially set up Benghazi as a floating TDY platform with successive principal officers often confined to the SMC due to threats and inadequate resources, and RSOs resorting to field - expedient solutions to correct security shortfalls.
Part of the failure in Benghazi is the State Department culture. There is absolutely no doubt regarding that and yes it cropped up all throughout this report. Facilities have to be classified as high risk all the way down to no risk. There needs to be missions that clarify their involvement in building relationships with countries and what exactly that means to the facilities where we house our country's interest.
The State Department is primarily about communication and building relationships. There has always been an understanding some of the missions were not up to protecting the personnel, but, that aspect cannot exist in areas under control of the facility and the staff. The fuel barrels were one of those aspects. As a matter of fact they invited the imagination of people who would seek to kill Americans. So, there needs to be improvements in how the State Department assesses danger and how secure facilities are to eliminate that danger.
Communication, cooperation, and coordination between Washington, Tripoli, and Benghazi occurred collegially at the working-level but were constrained by a lack of transparency, responsiveness, and leadership at senior bureau levels. (This is culture and it's inability to move beyond itself.)
I have to wonder if the State Department has a suggestion box. Seriously. I am sure there are many members of our personnel that have ideas about their working conditions and no one knows it. It would be completely inappropriate for the mission of the United States of America's foreign service to communicate well with sponsoring countries but the communication within the personnel compromised ideas and problem solving. Benghazi teaches 'out loud' how important reality is while hope should take a back seat. Should the hope exceed the ability of securing our personnel from danger?
The reason the efficacy issue has to be addressed is because our personnel are heroes before they start their first day of employment. They are vulnerable from the very aspect they are beginning a career they have longed for and educated for. Their own hopes and dreams for themselves compromises their safety. They care not for themselves enough to live within ? guidelines ? The efficacy has to be addressed so they live for another day for the rest of their lives. The late Ambassador Stevens was the USA in Benghazi. No one can replace him. He should not have disregarded the POTENTIAL for real danger that would end the mission of the USA in Libya.
The DS Bureau’s action officers who worked on Libya are to be commended for their efforts within DS and across the Department to provide additional security resources to Benghazi. Action officers in the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs’ (NEA) Office of Maghreb Affairs and Executive Office showed similar dedication in collaborating on solutions with their DS counterparts and responding to TDY staffing demands. However, in DS, NEA, and at post, there appeared to be very real confusion over who, ultimately, was responsible and empowered to make decisions based on both policy and security considerations.
The DS Bureau showed a lack of proactive senior leadership with respect to Benghazi, failing to ensure that the priority security needs of a high risk, high threat post were met. At the same time, with attention in late 2011 shifting to growing crises in Egypt and Syria, the NEA Bureau’s front office showed a lack of ownership of Benghazi’s security issues, and a tendency to rely totally on DS for the latter. The Board also found that Embassy Tripoli leadership, saddled with their own staffing and security challenges, did not single out a special need for increased security for Benghazi.
The Late Ambassador Stevens was self contained. He is not at fault, but, his intellect could not reason all the ACTUAL danger away. He was immune to recognizing faults of those he sought his involvement. He only reflected the promise of the USA to improve the lives in Libya. That is what he was suppose to do, everything else was superfluous to him. He had access in his mission and he needed nothing else.
Further shortfalls in Washington coordination were manifested by the flawed process by which Special Mission Benghazi’s extension until the end of December 2012 was approved, a decision that did not take security considerations adequately into account. The result was the continuation of Special Mission Benghazi with an uncertain future and a one-year expiration date that made allocations of resources for security upgrades and personnel assignments difficult.
Another key driver behind the weak security platform in Benghazi was the decision to treat Benghazi as a temporary, residential facility, not officially notified to the host government, even though it was also a full time office facility. This resulted in the Special Mission compound being excepted from office facility standards and accountability under the Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act of 1999 (SECCA) and the Overseas Security Policy Board (OSPB). Benghazi’s initial platform in November 2011 was far short of OSPB standards and remained so even in September 2012, despite multiple field-expedient upgrades funded by DS. (As a temporary, residential facility, SMC was not eligible for OBO-funded security upgrades.) A comprehensive upgrade and risk-mitigation plan did not exist, nor was a comprehensive security review conducted by Washington for Benghazi in 2012. The unique circumstances surrounding the creation of the mission in Benghazi as a temporary mission outside the realm of permanent diplomatic posts resulted in significant disconnects and support gaps.
1. The attacks in Benghazi were security-related, resulting in the deaths of our U.S. personnel after terrorists attacked two separate U.S. government facilities–the Special Mission compound (SMC) and the Annex.
Identification of the perpetrators and their motivations are the subject of an ongoing FBI criminal investigation. The Board concluded that no protest took place before the Special Mission and Annex attacks, which were unanticipated in their scale and intensity.
ADEQUACY OF SECURITY SYSTEMS AND PROCEDURES PRIOR TO SEPTEMBER 11, 2012
2. Systemic failures and leadership and management deficiencies at senior levels within two bureaus of the State Department resulted in a Special Mission security posture that was inadequate for Benghazi and grossly inadequate to deal with the attack that took place. Through the course of its inquiry, the Board interviewed over 100 individuals, reviewed thousands of pages of documents, and viewed hours of video footage. On the basis of its comprehensive review of this information, the Board remains fully convinced that responsibility for the tragic loss of life, injuries, and damage to U.S. facilities and property rests solely and completely with the terrorists who perpetrated the attack.
If there were no attacks there would be no deaths, however, the facility fell short from my point of view. Facility insufficiency is a KNOWN characteristic of danger to human life in the State Department. That aspect of our foreign service has a long history.
The facility was housing fuel in barrels. It was set up for failure. If the barrels were in their own secure storage there would be no deaths due to smoke inhalation. Where there exist this level of rudimentary danger it is possible to make the facility safer. Was there danger of deaths without the unsecured fuel? Every indication is that the personnel had control over the safe room. The terrorists never opened the room or secured the Ambassador away from his security. I suppose there is a percent of chance the safe room was not sincerely safe without the smoke, as the smoke would drive off the terrorists as well, but that is complete speculation and the facts don't point to that potential. Communication with support forces was horrible. It is questionable whether local forces would ever respond to calls from the Ambassador. In that lies the greatest danger. The consulate staff was invested in additional support at the other end of a phone call. That support was never forthcoming.
There is a real question about the efficacy of the foreign service that these deaths remind us. Should the foreign service be self-contained as are the recommendations within this report? Is the mission of the foreign service impacted by the idea of a mission that is a fortress? That is why the State Department was invested in hiring bodyguards. It protected the person who were invaluable beyond reason. The dedication of our foreign service is unquestionably perfect. They are beyond perfect. They cannot be replaced.
One of the aspects that cannot be ignored is what aspect of our fortification of our embassies and consulates actually turns into a liability to the purpose and outcomes of their mission? What can be done to tone down the fortifications without compromising safety of our personnel?
Overriding Factors
This is not to say, however, that there are no lessons to be learned. A recurring theme throughout the Board’s work was one also touched upon by the Nairobi and Dar es Salaam ARBs in 1999. Simply put, in the months leading up to September 11, 2012, security in Benghazi was not recognized and implemented as a “shared responsibility” in Washington, resulting in stove-piped discussions and decisions on policy and security. Key decisions, such as the extension of the State Department presence in Benghazi until December 2012, or non-decisions in Washington, such as the failure to establish standards for Benghazi and to meet them, or the lack of a cohesive staffing plan, essentially set up Benghazi as a floating TDY platform with successive principal officers often confined to the SMC due to threats and inadequate resources, and RSOs resorting to field - expedient solutions to correct security shortfalls.
Part of the failure in Benghazi is the State Department culture. There is absolutely no doubt regarding that and yes it cropped up all throughout this report. Facilities have to be classified as high risk all the way down to no risk. There needs to be missions that clarify their involvement in building relationships with countries and what exactly that means to the facilities where we house our country's interest.
The State Department is primarily about communication and building relationships. There has always been an understanding some of the missions were not up to protecting the personnel, but, that aspect cannot exist in areas under control of the facility and the staff. The fuel barrels were one of those aspects. As a matter of fact they invited the imagination of people who would seek to kill Americans. So, there needs to be improvements in how the State Department assesses danger and how secure facilities are to eliminate that danger.
Communication, cooperation, and coordination between Washington, Tripoli, and Benghazi occurred collegially at the working-level but were constrained by a lack of transparency, responsiveness, and leadership at senior bureau levels. (This is culture and it's inability to move beyond itself.)
I have to wonder if the State Department has a suggestion box. Seriously. I am sure there are many members of our personnel that have ideas about their working conditions and no one knows it. It would be completely inappropriate for the mission of the United States of America's foreign service to communicate well with sponsoring countries but the communication within the personnel compromised ideas and problem solving. Benghazi teaches 'out loud' how important reality is while hope should take a back seat. Should the hope exceed the ability of securing our personnel from danger?
The reason the efficacy issue has to be addressed is because our personnel are heroes before they start their first day of employment. They are vulnerable from the very aspect they are beginning a career they have longed for and educated for. Their own hopes and dreams for themselves compromises their safety. They care not for themselves enough to live within ? guidelines ? The efficacy has to be addressed so they live for another day for the rest of their lives. The late Ambassador Stevens was the USA in Benghazi. No one can replace him. He should not have disregarded the POTENTIAL for real danger that would end the mission of the USA in Libya.
The DS Bureau’s action officers who worked on Libya are to be commended for their efforts within DS and across the Department to provide additional security resources to Benghazi. Action officers in the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs’ (NEA) Office of Maghreb Affairs and Executive Office showed similar dedication in collaborating on solutions with their DS counterparts and responding to TDY staffing demands. However, in DS, NEA, and at post, there appeared to be very real confusion over who, ultimately, was responsible and empowered to make decisions based on both policy and security considerations.
The DS Bureau showed a lack of proactive senior leadership with respect to Benghazi, failing to ensure that the priority security needs of a high risk, high threat post were met. At the same time, with attention in late 2011 shifting to growing crises in Egypt and Syria, the NEA Bureau’s front office showed a lack of ownership of Benghazi’s security issues, and a tendency to rely totally on DS for the latter. The Board also found that Embassy Tripoli leadership, saddled with their own staffing and security challenges, did not single out a special need for increased security for Benghazi.
The Late Ambassador Stevens was self contained. He is not at fault, but, his intellect could not reason all the ACTUAL danger away. He was immune to recognizing faults of those he sought his involvement. He only reflected the promise of the USA to improve the lives in Libya. That is what he was suppose to do, everything else was superfluous to him. He had access in his mission and he needed nothing else.
Further shortfalls in Washington coordination were manifested by the flawed process by which Special Mission Benghazi’s extension until the end of December 2012 was approved, a decision that did not take security considerations adequately into account. The result was the continuation of Special Mission Benghazi with an uncertain future and a one-year expiration date that made allocations of resources for security upgrades and personnel assignments difficult.
Another key driver behind the weak security platform in Benghazi was the decision to treat Benghazi as a temporary, residential facility, not officially notified to the host government, even though it was also a full time office facility. This resulted in the Special Mission compound being excepted from office facility standards and accountability under the Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act of 1999 (SECCA) and the Overseas Security Policy Board (OSPB). Benghazi’s initial platform in November 2011 was far short of OSPB standards and remained so even in September 2012, despite multiple field-expedient upgrades funded by DS. (As a temporary, residential facility, SMC was not eligible for OBO-funded security upgrades.) A comprehensive upgrade and risk-mitigation plan did not exist, nor was a comprehensive security review conducted by Washington for Benghazi in 2012. The unique circumstances surrounding the creation of the mission in Benghazi as a temporary mission outside the realm of permanent diplomatic posts resulted in significant disconnects and support gaps.
