IMPACT OF INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION AVAILABILITY 4.
The Board found that intelligence provided no immediate, specific tactical warning of the September 11 attacks. Known gaps existed in the intelligence community’s understanding of extremist militias in Libya and ihe potential threat they posed to U.S. interests, although some threat were known to exist.
Did I say over and over and over, intelligence was poor? Did I relay that insight? DID I? Don't pretend I am not read, I know I am. YET, the scandal and the sensationalism was paramount to cutting down the former Secretary Clinton. As a matter of fact I stated that FACT the day of the attack and long before this report existed. My observation was more than reasonable given information within the media, but, that would never do the USA media.
NO? Look it up right here on this blog!
Terrorist networks are difficult to monitor, and the Board emphasizes the conclusion of previous accountability review boards that vulnerable missions cannot rely on receiving specific warning intelligence. Similarly, the lack of specific threat intelligence does not imply a lessening of probability of a terrorist attack. The Board found that there was a tendency on the part of policy, security and other U.S. government officials to rely heavily on the probability of warning intelligence and on the absence of specific threat information. The result was possibly to overlook the usefulness of taking a hard look at accumulated, sometimes circumstantial information, and instead to fail to appreciate threats and understand trends, particularly based on increased violence and the targeting of foreign diplomats and international organizations in Benghazi. The latter information failed to come into clear relief against a backdrop of the lack of effective governance, widespread and growing political violence and instability and the ready availability of weapons in eastern Libya. There were U.S. assessments that provided situational awareness on the persistent, general threat to U.S. and Western interests in eastern Libya, including Benghazi. Board members, however, were struck by the lack of discussion focused specifically on Benghazi.
The late Ambassador Stevens was the authority in Libya, specifically Benghazi. No else could advise him UNLESS there was specific intelligence to the area. Which there wasn't. Situational awareness was respected when meetings were held in the compound.
Might I add that when the USA is engaged in hideous wars it detracts from vital missions elsewhere that might actually bring peace to the Middle East. Is there any clear understanding that the war into Iraq was illegal as the USA's return is as well.
AND.
Applying the idea the USA should never have left Iraq (a known illegal and failed war) to that of Afghanistan is pure stupidity and an EXCUSE for continued missions in that country.
Benghazi’s threat environment had been generally deteriorating since the “gelatina” bomb was thrown over the SMC fence on April 6, but was not judged to have reached a critical point before September 11. The July 7 elections, about which there had been some trepidation regarding the security situation, passed with less violence than expected and were followed by Ramadan, when incidents are usually lower. Before September 11, a patchwork of militias in Benghazi had assumed many, if not all, of the security functions normally associated with central government organs, as the government had little authority or reach in Benghazi. There seemed to be no attempt, however, to link formally the many anti-Western incidents in Benghazi, the general declarations of threat in U.S. assessments and a proliferation of violence prone and little understood militias, the lack of any central authority and a general perception of a deteriorating security environment to any more specific and timely analysis of the threat to U.S. government facilities.
Board members found that there was little understanding of militias in Benghazi and the threat they posed to U.S. interests. One prime factor behind this knowledge gap was that eastern Libya is home to many militias, which are constantly dissolving, splitting apart and reforming.
...constantly dissolving, splitting apart and reforming...in these Third World countries are not a strategy, it is economic.
Furthermore, many individuals are associated with more than one militia. Understanding of February 17, in particular, was further limited by the fact that it is an umbrella organization, made up of many different militias with differing ideologies, some of which are extremist in nature.
February 17 being an umbrella organization was intelligence. The question is was it sufficient intelligence and did it have conflict of interest to that of Americans?
The Board determined there were no warnings from Libyan interlocutor.
There is the answer. February 17 was an unknown commodity and was trusted without cause.
The Board found that intelligence provided no immediate, specific tactical warning of the September 11 attacks. Known gaps existed in the intelligence community’s understanding of extremist militias in Libya and ihe potential threat they posed to U.S. interests, although some threat were known to exist.
Did I say over and over and over, intelligence was poor? Did I relay that insight? DID I? Don't pretend I am not read, I know I am. YET, the scandal and the sensationalism was paramount to cutting down the former Secretary Clinton. As a matter of fact I stated that FACT the day of the attack and long before this report existed. My observation was more than reasonable given information within the media, but, that would never do the USA media.
NO? Look it up right here on this blog!
Terrorist networks are difficult to monitor, and the Board emphasizes the conclusion of previous accountability review boards that vulnerable missions cannot rely on receiving specific warning intelligence. Similarly, the lack of specific threat intelligence does not imply a lessening of probability of a terrorist attack. The Board found that there was a tendency on the part of policy, security and other U.S. government officials to rely heavily on the probability of warning intelligence and on the absence of specific threat information. The result was possibly to overlook the usefulness of taking a hard look at accumulated, sometimes circumstantial information, and instead to fail to appreciate threats and understand trends, particularly based on increased violence and the targeting of foreign diplomats and international organizations in Benghazi. The latter information failed to come into clear relief against a backdrop of the lack of effective governance, widespread and growing political violence and instability and the ready availability of weapons in eastern Libya. There were U.S. assessments that provided situational awareness on the persistent, general threat to U.S. and Western interests in eastern Libya, including Benghazi. Board members, however, were struck by the lack of discussion focused specifically on Benghazi.
The late Ambassador Stevens was the authority in Libya, specifically Benghazi. No else could advise him UNLESS there was specific intelligence to the area. Which there wasn't. Situational awareness was respected when meetings were held in the compound.
Might I add that when the USA is engaged in hideous wars it detracts from vital missions elsewhere that might actually bring peace to the Middle East. Is there any clear understanding that the war into Iraq was illegal as the USA's return is as well.
AND.
Applying the idea the USA should never have left Iraq (a known illegal and failed war) to that of Afghanistan is pure stupidity and an EXCUSE for continued missions in that country.
Benghazi’s threat environment had been generally deteriorating since the “gelatina” bomb was thrown over the SMC fence on April 6, but was not judged to have reached a critical point before September 11. The July 7 elections, about which there had been some trepidation regarding the security situation, passed with less violence than expected and were followed by Ramadan, when incidents are usually lower. Before September 11, a patchwork of militias in Benghazi had assumed many, if not all, of the security functions normally associated with central government organs, as the government had little authority or reach in Benghazi. There seemed to be no attempt, however, to link formally the many anti-Western incidents in Benghazi, the general declarations of threat in U.S. assessments and a proliferation of violence prone and little understood militias, the lack of any central authority and a general perception of a deteriorating security environment to any more specific and timely analysis of the threat to U.S. government facilities.
Board members found that there was little understanding of militias in Benghazi and the threat they posed to U.S. interests. One prime factor behind this knowledge gap was that eastern Libya is home to many militias, which are constantly dissolving, splitting apart and reforming.
...constantly dissolving, splitting apart and reforming...in these Third World countries are not a strategy, it is economic.
Furthermore, many individuals are associated with more than one militia. Understanding of February 17, in particular, was further limited by the fact that it is an umbrella organization, made up of many different militias with differing ideologies, some of which are extremist in nature.
February 17 being an umbrella organization was intelligence. The question is was it sufficient intelligence and did it have conflict of interest to that of Americans?
The Board determined there were no warnings from Libyan interlocutor.
There is the answer. February 17 was an unknown commodity and was trusted without cause.
