Physical Security
Given the threat environment, the physical security platform in Benghazi was inadequate. It is incumbent upon the Board, however, to acknowledge that several upgrades and repairs took place over 2012. DS provided additional funding for the Local Guard Force (LGF), February 17, and residential security upgrades, including heightening the outer perimeter wall, safety grills on safe area egress windows that helped save the life of ARSO 1 on the night of September 11, concrete jersey barriers, manual drop-arm vehicle barriers, a steel gate for the Villa C safe area, some locally manufactured steel doors, sandbag fortifications, security cameras, some additional security lighting, guard booths, and an Internal Defense Notification System. Because OBO does not fund security upgrades for “temporary” facilities, DS also identified non-traditional funding streams to fund physical security upgrades and worked with the IMOs, NEA and Embassy Tripoli to move funds and supplies to Benghazi. The Engineering Security Office (ESO) in Cairo provided strong technical support and regularly visited. Following the June 2012 IED incident, which blew a large hole in the compound wall, DS, OBO, Tripoli, NEA and ESO Cairo immediately responded to Benghazi’s request for assistance. Tripoli identified OBO funds that could be used to fix the wall, and ESO Cairo traveled to Benghazi on June 8 to provide technical support. The TDY IMOs worked tirelessly with the RSOs, Tripoli procurement and financial YIMOs worked tirelessly with the RSOs, Tripoli procurement and financial management staff, and Libyan professionals on statements of work, contracts and funding for the emergency repair of the SMC wall and for the other physical security upgrades, as well as ongoing electrical repairs. New upgrades remained a challenge, however, due to a lack of cash reserves and contract and procurement expertise, which meant Benghazi had to rely on Tripoli for further processing.
Benghazi was known in July 2012 to be a high risk facility and yet the funding was not available to over come the security demands. The late Ambassador was working on hope and not reality. He also sought to contain his exposure to danger through a time component. When he was in Libya it was for a fairly short period of time not a full compliment of permanency. He expected to leave after his diplomatic agenda was fulfilled. He used 'time' as a defense for his life and that of his personnel. The use of "time" as a defense is used by emergency personnel in a war zone.
The Board found, however, that Washington showed a tendency to overemphasize the positive impact of physical security upgrades, which were often field expedient improvements to a profoundly weak platform, while generally failing to meet Benghazi’s repeated requests to augment the numbers of TDY DS personnel. The insufficient Special Mission compound security platform was at variance with the appropriate Overseas Security Policy Board (OSPB) standards with respect to perimeter, interior security, and safe areas. Benghazi was also under resourced with regard to certain needed security equipment.
Embassies and consulates are not suppose to be prisons. The embassy in Iran became exactly that when hostages were taken. The compounds are suppose to provide security, but, should never serve as a war asset. Such facilities could be assessed by terrorists that we know use existing infrastructure to their advantage. Just a thought. I think the new aspect of a contingency force should be the focus of high risk missions. The contingency should have what they need for infrastructure which might improve funding as well. Every facility in the year 2015 should have a viable contingency infrastructure PREPARED so it can be implemented immediately. Benghazi needed that immediacy. Ex. The seals carried out a mission to end the life of bin Laden, right? The compound has to provide for such extraction of personnel.
Given the threat environment, the physical security platform in Benghazi was inadequate. It is incumbent upon the Board, however, to acknowledge that several upgrades and repairs took place over 2012. DS provided additional funding for the Local Guard Force (LGF), February 17, and residential security upgrades, including heightening the outer perimeter wall, safety grills on safe area egress windows that helped save the life of ARSO 1 on the night of September 11, concrete jersey barriers, manual drop-arm vehicle barriers, a steel gate for the Villa C safe area, some locally manufactured steel doors, sandbag fortifications, security cameras, some additional security lighting, guard booths, and an Internal Defense Notification System. Because OBO does not fund security upgrades for “temporary” facilities, DS also identified non-traditional funding streams to fund physical security upgrades and worked with the IMOs, NEA and Embassy Tripoli to move funds and supplies to Benghazi. The Engineering Security Office (ESO) in Cairo provided strong technical support and regularly visited. Following the June 2012 IED incident, which blew a large hole in the compound wall, DS, OBO, Tripoli, NEA and ESO Cairo immediately responded to Benghazi’s request for assistance. Tripoli identified OBO funds that could be used to fix the wall, and ESO Cairo traveled to Benghazi on June 8 to provide technical support. The TDY IMOs worked tirelessly with the RSOs, Tripoli procurement and financial YIMOs worked tirelessly with the RSOs, Tripoli procurement and financial management staff, and Libyan professionals on statements of work, contracts and funding for the emergency repair of the SMC wall and for the other physical security upgrades, as well as ongoing electrical repairs. New upgrades remained a challenge, however, due to a lack of cash reserves and contract and procurement expertise, which meant Benghazi had to rely on Tripoli for further processing.
Benghazi was known in July 2012 to be a high risk facility and yet the funding was not available to over come the security demands. The late Ambassador was working on hope and not reality. He also sought to contain his exposure to danger through a time component. When he was in Libya it was for a fairly short period of time not a full compliment of permanency. He expected to leave after his diplomatic agenda was fulfilled. He used 'time' as a defense for his life and that of his personnel. The use of "time" as a defense is used by emergency personnel in a war zone.
The Board found, however, that Washington showed a tendency to overemphasize the positive impact of physical security upgrades, which were often field expedient improvements to a profoundly weak platform, while generally failing to meet Benghazi’s repeated requests to augment the numbers of TDY DS personnel. The insufficient Special Mission compound security platform was at variance with the appropriate Overseas Security Policy Board (OSPB) standards with respect to perimeter, interior security, and safe areas. Benghazi was also under resourced with regard to certain needed security equipment.
Embassies and consulates are not suppose to be prisons. The embassy in Iran became exactly that when hostages were taken. The compounds are suppose to provide security, but, should never serve as a war asset. Such facilities could be assessed by terrorists that we know use existing infrastructure to their advantage. Just a thought. I think the new aspect of a contingency force should be the focus of high risk missions. The contingency should have what they need for infrastructure which might improve funding as well. Every facility in the year 2015 should have a viable contingency infrastructure PREPARED so it can be implemented immediately. Benghazi needed that immediacy. Ex. The seals carried out a mission to end the life of bin Laden, right? The compound has to provide for such extraction of personnel.
