Personnel
The Board found the short-term, transitory nature of Benghazi’s staffing to be another primary driver behind the inadequate security platform in Benghazi. Staffing was at times woefully insufficient considering post’s security posture and high risk, high threat environment. The end result was a lack of institutional knowledge and mission capacity which could not be overcome by talent and hard work alone, although the Board found ample evidence of both in those who served there. The situation was exacerbated by the lack of Locally Employed Staff (LES) who would normally provide a backstop of continuity, local knowledge, and language ability. This staffing “churn” had significant detrimental effects on the post’s ability to assess adequately both the political and security environment, as well as to provide the necessary advocacy and follow-through on major, essential security upgrades.
The Board determined that DS staffing levels in Benghazi after Embassy Tripoli re-opened were inadequate, decreasing significantly after then-Special Envoy Stevens’ departure in November 2011.
He was doing his own staffing in Benghazi. He reasoned the security staff was enough. He had different priorities AND he also believed Benghazi was more secure than Tripoli where explosions had occurred near the embassy. He was conducting his mission from a hotel room in Libya. There has to be the question if hotels are to be considered nothing more than a secure place while waiting transport out of the country. HOWEVER, if that stipulation was made as policy, hotel rooms would never be accessed for safety purposes. The USA policy provides for enormous accommodation for an ambassador to achieve goals. What of that has to be tempered to modify the ambitions of it's personnel.
Where is the stop gap to require a reality check? That reality check has to be person to person, not simply a learned tool.
Power. He had the power of the USA behind his mission. He was trusted with that power unquestionably. I am sure he appreciated that power, but, there needed to be a stop and assess before he substituted the idea of safety in Benghazi at a delicate time of year.
The person(s) that would have assessed the potential to danger of any personnel will require additional spending. The spending has to be unquestionable and permanent.
Actually, that person(s) should be military. A reality check with military personnel will remind the State Department personnel of their vulnerability. It would be a time when a contingency could be determined to further the high risk mission or call them home with transport on the way.
In my opinion, there is a process problem as well, when including a stop gap.
Although a full complement of five DS agents for Benghazi was initially projected, and later requested multiple times, Special Mission Benghazi achieved a level of five DS agents (not counting DoD - provided TDY Site Security Team personnel sent by Embassy Tripoli) for only 23 days between January 1 - September 9, 2012. As it became clear that DS would not provide a steady complement of five TDY DS agents to Benghazi, expectations on the ground were lowered by the daunting task of gaining approvals and the reality of an ever-shifting DS personnel platform. From discussions with former Benghazi-based staff, Board members concluded that the persistence of DS leadership in Washington in refusing to provide a steady platform of four to five DS agents created a resignation on the part of post about asking for more. The TDY DS agents resorted to doing the best they could with the limited resources provided.
Furthermore, DS’s reliance on volunteers for TDY positions meant that the ARSOs in Benghazi often had relatively little or no prior DS program management or overseas experience. For a time,more experienced RSOs were sent out on longer term TDYs, but even that appeared to diminish after June 2012, exactly at the time the security environment in Benghazi was deteriorating further. It bears emphasizing, however, that the Board found the work done by these often junior DS agents to be exemplary. But given the threat environment and with very little operational oversight from more experienced, senior colleagues, combined with an under-resourced security platform, these agents were not well served by their leadership in Washington. The lack of Arabic language skills among most American personnel assigned to Benghazi and the lack of a dedicated LES interpreter and sufficient local staff also served as a barrier to effective communication and situational awareness at the Special Mission.
Required security training for DS agents prior to service in Benghazi consisted of the High Threat Training Course (HTTC). However, domestically-based DS agents who had not served abroad did not have the opportunity to receive RSO training before serving in Benghazi. In addition, after April 2012 all personnel scheduled to serve in Libya for over 30 days were required to take the Foreign Affairs Counter Threat (FACT) training. IMOs, who also served as the “management officer” at post, did not, as a prerequisite, receive any basic management or General Services Officer (GSO) training to prepare them for their duties.
There was too much emphasis on the late Ambassador's authority. He was unable to remove himself from the mission to accept a far less degree of security. I have a question. Was the mission hopelessly under funded to cause him to accept high risk without discerning safety? If a mission was hopelessly underfunded there would be a point where he would have decided, "That's life for me." and would move forward when he should have returned home. His British counter part left their security vehicles with him and left the country. Why was that not a reality check? He was alone in Benghazi. His peers had left.
The Board determined that reliance on February 17 for security in the event of an attack was misplaced, even though February 17 had been considered to have responded satisfactorily to previous, albeit less threatening, incidents. The four assigned February 17 guards were insufficient and did not have the requisite skills and reliability to provide a reasonable level of security on a 24/7 basis for an eight acre compound with an extended perimeter wall. In the days prior to the attack and on September 11, 2012, one was absent. Over the course of its inquiry, the Board also learned of troubling indicators of February 17’s loyalties and its readiness to assist U.S. personnel. In the weeks preceding the Ambassador’sarrival, February 17 had complained about salaries and the lack of a contract for its personnel. At the time of the attacks, February 17 had ceased accompanying Special Mission vehicle movements in protest. The Blue Mountain Libya (BML) unarmed guards, whose primary responsibilities were to provide early warning and control access to the SMC, were also poorly skilled.
All the precautions were dismissed and here is a complaint about the lack of commitment by the USA to provide contracts. One lesson the USA needs to learn is the "Warlord Paradigm." Loyalty goes to the warlord that provides the greatest wealth. Think ancient Rome and 'the dole.' It is exactly the same thing.
It is worthy to note the late Ambassador Stevens never once thought, "You can take this job and shove it."
The Board found the short-term, transitory nature of Benghazi’s staffing to be another primary driver behind the inadequate security platform in Benghazi. Staffing was at times woefully insufficient considering post’s security posture and high risk, high threat environment. The end result was a lack of institutional knowledge and mission capacity which could not be overcome by talent and hard work alone, although the Board found ample evidence of both in those who served there. The situation was exacerbated by the lack of Locally Employed Staff (LES) who would normally provide a backstop of continuity, local knowledge, and language ability. This staffing “churn” had significant detrimental effects on the post’s ability to assess adequately both the political and security environment, as well as to provide the necessary advocacy and follow-through on major, essential security upgrades.
The Board determined that DS staffing levels in Benghazi after Embassy Tripoli re-opened were inadequate, decreasing significantly after then-Special Envoy Stevens’ departure in November 2011.
He was doing his own staffing in Benghazi. He reasoned the security staff was enough. He had different priorities AND he also believed Benghazi was more secure than Tripoli where explosions had occurred near the embassy. He was conducting his mission from a hotel room in Libya. There has to be the question if hotels are to be considered nothing more than a secure place while waiting transport out of the country. HOWEVER, if that stipulation was made as policy, hotel rooms would never be accessed for safety purposes. The USA policy provides for enormous accommodation for an ambassador to achieve goals. What of that has to be tempered to modify the ambitions of it's personnel.
Where is the stop gap to require a reality check? That reality check has to be person to person, not simply a learned tool.
Power. He had the power of the USA behind his mission. He was trusted with that power unquestionably. I am sure he appreciated that power, but, there needed to be a stop and assess before he substituted the idea of safety in Benghazi at a delicate time of year.
The person(s) that would have assessed the potential to danger of any personnel will require additional spending. The spending has to be unquestionable and permanent.
Actually, that person(s) should be military. A reality check with military personnel will remind the State Department personnel of their vulnerability. It would be a time when a contingency could be determined to further the high risk mission or call them home with transport on the way.
In my opinion, there is a process problem as well, when including a stop gap.
Although a full complement of five DS agents for Benghazi was initially projected, and later requested multiple times, Special Mission Benghazi achieved a level of five DS agents (not counting DoD - provided TDY Site Security Team personnel sent by Embassy Tripoli) for only 23 days between January 1 - September 9, 2012. As it became clear that DS would not provide a steady complement of five TDY DS agents to Benghazi, expectations on the ground were lowered by the daunting task of gaining approvals and the reality of an ever-shifting DS personnel platform. From discussions with former Benghazi-based staff, Board members concluded that the persistence of DS leadership in Washington in refusing to provide a steady platform of four to five DS agents created a resignation on the part of post about asking for more. The TDY DS agents resorted to doing the best they could with the limited resources provided.
Furthermore, DS’s reliance on volunteers for TDY positions meant that the ARSOs in Benghazi often had relatively little or no prior DS program management or overseas experience. For a time,more experienced RSOs were sent out on longer term TDYs, but even that appeared to diminish after June 2012, exactly at the time the security environment in Benghazi was deteriorating further. It bears emphasizing, however, that the Board found the work done by these often junior DS agents to be exemplary. But given the threat environment and with very little operational oversight from more experienced, senior colleagues, combined with an under-resourced security platform, these agents were not well served by their leadership in Washington. The lack of Arabic language skills among most American personnel assigned to Benghazi and the lack of a dedicated LES interpreter and sufficient local staff also served as a barrier to effective communication and situational awareness at the Special Mission.
Required security training for DS agents prior to service in Benghazi consisted of the High Threat Training Course (HTTC). However, domestically-based DS agents who had not served abroad did not have the opportunity to receive RSO training before serving in Benghazi. In addition, after April 2012 all personnel scheduled to serve in Libya for over 30 days were required to take the Foreign Affairs Counter Threat (FACT) training. IMOs, who also served as the “management officer” at post, did not, as a prerequisite, receive any basic management or General Services Officer (GSO) training to prepare them for their duties.
There was too much emphasis on the late Ambassador's authority. He was unable to remove himself from the mission to accept a far less degree of security. I have a question. Was the mission hopelessly under funded to cause him to accept high risk without discerning safety? If a mission was hopelessly underfunded there would be a point where he would have decided, "That's life for me." and would move forward when he should have returned home. His British counter part left their security vehicles with him and left the country. Why was that not a reality check? He was alone in Benghazi. His peers had left.
The Board determined that reliance on February 17 for security in the event of an attack was misplaced, even though February 17 had been considered to have responded satisfactorily to previous, albeit less threatening, incidents. The four assigned February 17 guards were insufficient and did not have the requisite skills and reliability to provide a reasonable level of security on a 24/7 basis for an eight acre compound with an extended perimeter wall. In the days prior to the attack and on September 11, 2012, one was absent. Over the course of its inquiry, the Board also learned of troubling indicators of February 17’s loyalties and its readiness to assist U.S. personnel. In the weeks preceding the Ambassador’sarrival, February 17 had complained about salaries and the lack of a contract for its personnel. At the time of the attacks, February 17 had ceased accompanying Special Mission vehicle movements in protest. The Blue Mountain Libya (BML) unarmed guards, whose primary responsibilities were to provide early warning and control access to the SMC, were also poorly skilled.
All the precautions were dismissed and here is a complaint about the lack of commitment by the USA to provide contracts. One lesson the USA needs to learn is the "Warlord Paradigm." Loyalty goes to the warlord that provides the greatest wealth. Think ancient Rome and 'the dole.' It is exactly the same thing.
It is worthy to note the late Ambassador Stevens never once thought, "You can take this job and shove it."
