The Board determined that U.S. personnel on the ground in Benghazi performed with courage and readiness to risk their lives to protect their colleagues, in a near impossible situation. The Board members believe every possible effort was made to rescue and recover Ambassador Stevens and Sean Smith.
The interagency response was timely and appropriate, but there simply was not enough time for armed U.S. military assets to have made a difference.
4. The Board found that intelligence provided no immediate, specific tactical warning of the September 11 attacks. Known gaps existed in the intelligence community’s understanding of extremist militias in Libya and the potential threat they posed to U.S. interests, although some threats were known to exist.
5. The Board found that certain senior State Department officials within two bureaus demonstrated a lack of proactive leadership and management ability in their responses to security concerns posed by Special Mission Benghazi, given the deteriorating threat environment and the lack of reliable host government protection. However, the Board did not find reasonable cause to determine that any individual U.S. government employee breached his or her duty.
Paragraph 5 is interesting. Senior State Department officials demonstrated a lack of proactive leadership...However,...did not find reasonable cause to determine that any individual US government employee breached his or her duty.
What is that double talk, anyway?
The interagency response was timely and appropriate, but there simply was not enough time for armed U.S. military assets to have made a difference.
4. The Board found that intelligence provided no immediate, specific tactical warning of the September 11 attacks. Known gaps existed in the intelligence community’s understanding of extremist militias in Libya and the potential threat they posed to U.S. interests, although some threats were known to exist.
5. The Board found that certain senior State Department officials within two bureaus demonstrated a lack of proactive leadership and management ability in their responses to security concerns posed by Special Mission Benghazi, given the deteriorating threat environment and the lack of reliable host government protection. However, the Board did not find reasonable cause to determine that any individual U.S. government employee breached his or her duty.
Paragraph 5 is interesting. Senior State Department officials demonstrated a lack of proactive leadership...However,...did not find reasonable cause to determine that any individual US government employee breached his or her duty.
What is that double talk, anyway?
Everyone was doing their jobs, but, it was inadequate. If everyone was doing their jobs so, why were their jobs inadequate to define the risk of Benghazi?
The department was caught up in it's internal culture. It was a stove pipe problem. The danger was known and recorded, but, the culture was not INSTRUCTIVE. It didn't react to the danger threat because the AUTHORITY for the mission was the Ambassador.
There was lack of APPRECIATION to the danger because no one else knew Libya and especially Benghazi as the Ambassador did. He wasn't DOD, he was State. When assessments were that the mission had threats, there was tighter security of the Ambassador's person (the extra body guards). There was no militarized deployment that the Ambassador had control over nor should there have been. He did not have the authority to call in DOD. ANY CONTINGENCY would be the responsibility of the President of the United States of America.
In order for POTUS to act there would have to be an appreciation of the threat. That understanding of the threat began and ended with Ambassador Stevens. It just did. Everyone knew he was an exceptional Ambassador. He was brilliant. He loved Libya, especially Benghazi and he was the primary reason the mission fell short of 'enough' safety.
Anyone along the way was carrying out their responsibility IN SUPPORT of the Libya Mission, but, there was no real understanding of the threat assessment to the point where a single wire or statement would drive the department into emergency mode. That demand for emergency intervention would have to come from the Ambassador.
The Libya mission was self-contained with very talented people involved WITH BACK UP by whatever services State could provide. But, State while at the service to the Ambassador could not predetermine a response. The request for additional security was accommodated by body guards and not military support.
There would have been a different response if the late Ambassador was SUPERVISING the Libya operation. He had an appreciation for the threat assessment. He knew Libya. No one that was in the capacity in service to the Ambassador had his head on their shoulders. There was no one at State that knew Libya to understand the requests being made to the extent it needed more of a military response.
In order for POTUS to act there would have to be an appreciation of the threat. That understanding of the threat began and ended with Ambassador Stevens. It just did. Everyone knew he was an exceptional Ambassador. He was brilliant. He loved Libya, especially Benghazi and he was the primary reason the mission fell short of 'enough' safety.
Anyone along the way was carrying out their responsibility IN SUPPORT of the Libya Mission, but, there was no real understanding of the threat assessment to the point where a single wire or statement would drive the department into emergency mode. That demand for emergency intervention would have to come from the Ambassador.
The Libya mission was self-contained with very talented people involved WITH BACK UP by whatever services State could provide. But, State while at the service to the Ambassador could not predetermine a response. The request for additional security was accommodated by body guards and not military support.
There would have been a different response if the late Ambassador was SUPERVISING the Libya operation. He had an appreciation for the threat assessment. He knew Libya. No one that was in the capacity in service to the Ambassador had his head on their shoulders. There was no one at State that knew Libya to understand the requests being made to the extent it needed more of a military response.
"If I were responsible for supporting the late Ambassador in his requests and I received a wire for additional security. Why would I think that meant a militarized response if all I did in support to missions around the world was to normally provide body guards?" I would dispatch body guards at any request.
Body guards are not militarized. State, in it's culture never dispatched a militarized unit nor should it.
The culture of UNDERSTOOD DANGER in State was about protecting the person and not concerning itself with a DOD paradigm. The culture, in the case of Libya, was an equal threat as any militia.
