STATEMENT OF EDWIN LYMAN, PHD
SCIENTIFIC DIRECTOR, NUCLEAR CONTROL INSTITUTE
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Briefing on
Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research Programs and Performance
May 10, 2001
...Clearly, any perception that managerial bias influences the outcome of NRC-sponsored research is very damaging to RES, as well as to the Commission, and renewed and vigilant efforts must be made to ensure that RES is insulated from political and budgetary pressure. Otherwise, RES will not be regarded by the public as a credible source of safety information, and the Commission's credibility will likewise be damaged.
In summary, a big part of the problem is the requirement that RES activities conform to the NRC performance goal of "reducing unnecessary regulatory burden." A fundamental goal of safety research is to reduce uncertainties and provide a more precise determination of safety margins. The results of such efforts may uncover margins that are unacceptably small as well as unnecessarily large. To regain public confidence in NRC's objectivity, RES must demonstrate that it is willing to deliver bad news as well as good, and the other NRC offices must be willing to respond promptly and appropriately to RES findings.
Thank you for your attention.
In 2002, Mr. Lyman spoke about the Pebble Bed Modular Reactor and it's Safety Issues (Click on for pdf)
2003 was an even more interesting year. (click on for complete content)
Declaration to NRC Regarding Inadequacy of Physical Protection for Plutonium Test Assembly Use
...12. The United States is planning to pursue a new revision of INFCIRC/225 (Rev. 4) at about the same time that the export of up to 140 kilograms of U.S. weapon-grade plutonium oxide to France on United Kingdom-flagged vessels will take place. In view of this, it is prudent that NRC anticipate these changes and adopt much more stringent export licensing criteria for the physical protection of this material in international transport and foreign storage than are embodied in the current, pre-September 11 version of INFCIRC/225. In particular, NRC should require foreign physical protection standards to be even more stringent than U.S. domestic regulations require, given that the vulnerability of this material to theft or sabotage will no doubt be far greater outside of United States territory. This would involve requirements for development of a DBT based on the most current intelligence assessments of the terrorist threat, for the routine deployment of robust, armed paramilitary response forces and for periodic and realistic force-on-force testing of their capabilities. Also, procedures for access authorization for Category I nuclear materials and facilities must involve much more thorough background investigations than the INFCIRC/225 "trustworthiness" standard would suggest, and should entail a full review of all personnel by law enforcement and intelligence agencies for possible connections to terrorist activities.
I do believe Mr. Lyman and his piers are interested in protecting any form of nuclear initiative, including energy, from terrorists. Mr. Lyman, nor are his collegues terrorists.
The NRC's dirty little secret (click on for complete text)
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is still unwilling to respond to serious security problems.
For a quarter of a century, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) kept its dirty little secret: Despite the fact that a successful attack on a U.S. nuclear plant could cause thousands of illnesses and deaths in the surrounding area, and despite the clear increase in terrorist threats over that same period, the commission continued to require the country's nuclear power plant operators to maintain only a minimal security capability.
The NRC has not required nuclear facilities to guard against an assault by more than three attackers--and never with the help of more than a single insider. In addition, for purposes of planning security, the NRC assumed that the three attackers would act as a single team, armed with nothing more sophisticated than hand-held automatic rifles.
More troubling, the commission has not required plant operators to be able to withstand a possible attack by boat or plane--nor to have the capacity to defend in any way against an attack by anyone defined as "enemies of the United States"--nations or sub-national groups.
After September 11, 2001, when 19 Al Qaeda recruits acting in four coordinated teams used commercial airliners to attack the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, a great deal of concern was expressed about U.S. nuclear plants' vulnerability to terrorist attack, and questions were raised about increasing security at nuclear facilities. In early 2002, it was widely believed that the NRC would finally upgrade its 25-year-old "design basis threat"--the maximum threat that nuclear plant security systems are required to protect against--and that considerably higher standards would be established.
