September 10, 2018
By Alex Ward
...“They (click here) kept the nuclear systems out (of the parade) because they don’t need to flaunt them anymore,” tweeted Vipin Narang, a nuclear expert at MIT. In other words, now that North Korea has proved it can most likely hit America with a nuclear weapon, there’s no need to signal to everyone — and Trump especially — that it can do so.
If true, that means North Korea may start to act like India, Pakistan, and Israel: The country may avoid talking about its nuclear capabilities, even though the world knows it has bombs.
So looking at this another way, North Korea just acted like an established nuclear power and received praise from Trump for it. That could lead Kim to think the US will accept North Korea’s arsenal as long as he doesn’t boast about it, which would solidify Pyongyang’s place as a nuclear power — and make Trump the president who gave his seal of approval....
September 17, 2018By Jung H. Pak
...Third (click here) Kim seeks to maintain the initiative on shaping the global debate about how to approach the North Korea problem. That is, he is looking to shift the discussion to non-nuclear issues to deflect attention away from its nuclear weapons and dampen the international community’s appetite for implementing sanctions. After declaring that he has completed the nuclear weapons program, Kim has pivoted toward engagement and focusing on the economy—key themes in the recent parade held last week to celebrate the 70th anniversary of the country’s founding. The past nine months of summitry have revived and sustained calls for further engagement, even as Pyongyang continues to reject timelines and verification measures for denuclearization and covertly make additional progress on its strategic programs.
Finally, Kim is probably seeking to reduce his dependence on China by trying to start the process for peace negotiations with the United States. Kim might be calculating that sustained bilateral talks with Washington would increase his leverage against Beijing and stimulate Chinese leaders to be more pliable to Pyongyang’s preferences—such as reducing sanctions implementation—by taking advantage of Chinese concerns about being sidelined in Korean Peninsula issues....