In his pivotal contribution (click here for article in Prometheus - a scientific policy blog by the University of Colorado) to the US-Iran nuclear negotiations,
Ernest Moniz, US Secretary of Energy, offers a role model of how to
integrate science and politics.
Both Secretary Kerry and President Obama has stated the agreement with Iran brokered in Switzerland is based in access and transparency. There is no debating this agreement as political fodder. It is a very serious document.
April 12, 2015
The Washington Post Op-Ed
...Iran has repeatedly emphasized (click here) its commitment to a peaceful program, but today’s reality of national and U.N. sanctions highlights the international community’s concern about Iran’s past nuclear activity. The Lausanne understanding is not built on trust. It is built on hard-nosed requirements that would limit Iran’s activities and ensure vital access and transparency.
An important part of the parameters is a set of restrictions that would significantly increase the time it would take Iran to produce the nuclear material needed for a weapon — the breakout time — if it pursued one. The current breakout time is just two to three months. Under the JCPOA, that would increase to at least a year for at least 10 years, more than enough time to mount an effective response.
The negotiated parameters would block Iran’s four pathways to a nuclear weapon — the path through plutonium production at the Arak reactor, two paths to a uranium weapon through the Natanz and Fordow enrichment facilities, and the path of covert activity....
Both Secretary Kerry and President Obama has stated the agreement with Iran brokered in Switzerland is based in access and transparency. There is no debating this agreement as political fodder. It is a very serious document.
April 12, 2015
The Washington Post Op-Ed
...Iran has repeatedly emphasized (click here) its commitment to a peaceful program, but today’s reality of national and U.N. sanctions highlights the international community’s concern about Iran’s past nuclear activity. The Lausanne understanding is not built on trust. It is built on hard-nosed requirements that would limit Iran’s activities and ensure vital access and transparency.
An important part of the parameters is a set of restrictions that would significantly increase the time it would take Iran to produce the nuclear material needed for a weapon — the breakout time — if it pursued one. The current breakout time is just two to three months. Under the JCPOA, that would increase to at least a year for at least 10 years, more than enough time to mount an effective response.
The negotiated parameters would block Iran’s four pathways to a nuclear weapon — the path through plutonium production at the Arak reactor, two paths to a uranium weapon through the Natanz and Fordow enrichment facilities, and the path of covert activity....